Stewards of God: How the Taliban govern Afghanistan

When the radical Taliban movement took control of Afghanistan in 2021, many anticipated its inability to govern the state effectively. Contrary to those predictions, neighboring countries have gradually been lifting the Taliban off their lists of terrorist organizations and establishing trade relationships with them, while the anticipated governance collapse has not materialized. POLITIK Central Asia explored who governs the Islamic Emirate at the top, middle, and lower levels and assessed the risks posed by the Taliban’s unique perception of the nature of power for Afghanistan and the world.

Jihad, always jihad

When the radical Taliban movement first seized power in Afghanistan in 1996, the country was in chaos, lacking legal order and functioning state institutions. However, the landscape changed dramatically when the Taliban regained control in 2021 and declared the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” (IEA). Over the previous two decades, Afghanistan had built a political and legal framework supported by various laws, beginning with the 2004 constitution.

From the beginning, the Taliban made it clear they would establish their own governing system. They claimed they would use the “progressive” 1964 constitution of Zahir Shah, which notably granted women the right to vote, as a temporary foundation.

In practice, however, this constitution was never put into effect during their more than three years in power, and no new fundamental law has been enacted.

This is mainly because, unlike other armed groups in the Islamic world, the Taliban have never formed a political party. Throughout their history, they have relied on armed struggle and adhered to Sharia (Islamic law) as they interpret it.

The guiding principles for the Taliban’s governance are outlined in a 2022 book written in Arabic by Abdul Hakim Haqqani, the IEA’s Chief Justice. Titled “Al-Imarat al-Islamiyya wa Nizamaha” (“The Islamic Emirate and Its System of Governance”), the book features a foreword by the Taliban’s supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada. In this work, Haqqani articulates the Taliban’s vision for governance, asserting that the primary objective of an Islamic government is to conduct jihad, which he defines as the effort to establish a truly Islamic system.

He writes: “It is unacceptable for the soldiers of the Islamic Emirate to abandon jihad simply because the Americans and their allies have left Afghanistan. This is not the goal of Afghan jihad. This jihad aims to establish the order of Almighty Allah over His servants—the people of Afghanistan.”

Haqqani argues that the ideal form of leadership combines religious and political authority, meaning that religious leaders and scholars are best suited to govern a state. “They can guide people to the true Islamic faith because they are familiar with it,” he explains, though he provides no historical examples to support his claim.

Interestingly, in Sunni Islam, which the Taliban follow, there has traditionally been a clear distinction between religious and political leaders. Haqqani’s interpretation thus stands out as somewhat unique.

Despite his views, Haqqani acknowledges the principle of separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial branches. However, during their three-plus years in power, the Taliban have made no progress toward establishing legislative bodies. In fact, in August 2023, the Taliban banned all political parties in Afghanistan, monopolizing not only executive but also legislative functions in the state.

Although Haqqani mentions the Majlis ash-Shura (“Consultative Council”) as a model legislative body, in practice, the Taliban supreme leader, who holds the title Amir al-Mu’minin (“Commander of the Faithful”), serves as the primary source of law in contemporary Afghanistan. He also remains the highest authority in the executive and judicial branches, a position that not all Taliban members fully support.

The temporary as permanent

When the Taliban announced the establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) in August 2021, they promptly introduced the members of the new government, which consisted entirely of Taliban representatives. This cabinet included no women, and most of its members were ethnic Pashtuns. Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund led this new administration, who had previously served as the deputy head of the Taliban government from 1996 to 2001.

Interestingly, the Afghan cabinet is officially called Hokumat-e Sarpaarast, meaning “Interim Government,” with each member adding the title Sarpaarast, (“Acting”), to their designation. This underscores the Taliban’s view that all authority belongs to Allah, seeing themselves merely as His representatives on Earth.

Overall, the Taliban maintained the governmental structure inherited from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA), with a significant change being the replacement of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs with the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (Amr bil Ma’roof wa Nahi an al-Munkar).

The government currently comprises 26 ministries. While much of the staff remains from the previous administration, the leadership positions are now filled by Taliban members. Significant purges occurred mainly within the Ministry of Security, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Higher Education, where very few officials unaffiliated with the Taliban continue to serve.

Moreover, appointments to local government positions are now determined more by loyalty to the Taliban than by qualifications or professional experience.

Despite ongoing challenges in Afghanistan’s economy, the Taliban have ensured regular salary payments to civil servants. Since September 2021, unlike social welfare programs or financial aid for the poor, these payments have not been interrupted.

This leads to an important conclusion: in August 2021, the Taliban’s return to power alarmed mainly the progressive urban youth and those directly involved with the West. However, most civil servants appeared ready to adapt to the new system.

The trinity of the Taliban

One of the notable features of the governance system established by the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2021 is the significant influence of their supreme leader, Haibatullah Akhundzada. His headquarters are located in Kandahar, the historical heart of the Taliban movement, while the government and state institutions operate primarily from Kabul. As the “Commander of the Faithful,” he has the authority to make decisions and legislate without governmental approval, which has frustrated several cabinet members and, at times, led to public discontent.

For example, in February 2023, Acting Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani openly criticized the supreme leader, stating, “The monopolization of power and the imposition of one’s views harm the reputation of the entire system, and this is certainly not in our best interests.”

Disagreements within the Taliban, particularly over issues like women’s education, highlight the organization’s division into factions. Currently, there are at least three distinct groups within the Taliban.

The Haqqani network represents the first faction, led by Sirajuddin Haqqani himself.

The second group comprises a paramilitary branch overseen by Acting Defense Minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqub, who is the son of the original Taliban leader, Mullah Omar.

The third faction is discreetly led by Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Ghani Baradar, who advocates for more active negotiations with Western countries, reforms, and the inclusive participation of all Afghans in government. Notably, in September 2021, amid disagreements regarding cabinet composition—which excluded representatives from ethnic minorities—Baradar briefly left Kabul for Kandahar before returning.

The headquarters of the supreme leader operates independently of these factions and aligns with the most conservative elements of the movement. Akhundzada has made headlines for having appointed his own son as a suicide bomber.

Currently, the Taliban faces no significant challenges to its power within Afghanistan. The National Resistance Front (NRF), led by Ahmad Massoud, opposes the Taliban but remains active only on social media and abroad.

However, the real threat to the Taliban’s future may stem from within the movement itself, particularly in light of reports about Haibatullah Akhundzada’s deteriorating health. Having contracted COVID-19 twice, along with suffering from kidney and lung issues, his potential departure could trigger a power struggle among the factions, each vying for greater influence.

Growth against all odds

After taking power in Afghanistan in the fall of 2021, the Taliban emphasized their intention to represent the interests of all Afghans and vowed not to infringe on anyone’s rights.

In their pursuit of international recognition and the unfreezing of Afghan assets held in Western banks, the Taliban aimed to present themselves as distinct from their predecessors of 1996-2001. Unlike their earlier regime, which was marked by public executions and coercive demands on ethnic and religious minorities, they sought to project a more moderate image.

The Taliban, for their part, view any external demands as unwelcome interference in their internal affairs. Abdul Hakim Haqqani’s writings emphasize that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) is a “state free from any external interference,” reflecting their desire to distance themselves from the ousted republican government, which they regarded as a puppet regime.

In the years since their takeover, the Taliban have enacted multiple bans, particularly affecting women’s rights. These prohibitions include barring university education, restricting schooling beyond the sixth grade, forbidding women from working in non-governmental organizations, and limiting access to parks and fitness centers.

During their previous rule from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban gained recognition from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. However, today, even these nations refuse to acknowledge their government. Representatives from the Islamic world, including Qatar—home to the Taliban’s political office since 2013—have openly criticized the group for their domestic policies.

In September 2021, Qatar’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani, expressed disappointment, stating, “Such actions are disappointing and a step backward for Afghanistan,” in reference to the Taliban’s early actions in power.

Meanwhile, the Taliban are working to strengthen economic ties with the outside world, with a primary focus on their neighboring countries. Their largest trading partners now include Iran, China, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.

The Taliban has inherited an economic bloc from the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA), which is credited with stabilizing the Afghan economy and bolstering the national currency against the dollar. Notably, many members of this bloc possess Western education. With strict oversight over money flow and efforts to restore order at customs, Afghanistan’s economic indicators have shown signs of improvement. For instance, imports surged by 23%, while exports increased by 0.4% in 2023.

A threat to the world

At the same time, the implementation of large-scale projects on Afghan territory is hindered by the persistent terrorist threat despite certain improvements.

According to the Australian Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), which compiles the Global Terrorism Index, the number of victims and terrorist attacks in Afghanistan has decreased by 84% and 75%, respectively, since 2007. For the first time since 2019, Afghanistan was not the country most affected by terrorism in 2023.

However, groups such as “Al-Qaeda,” which is allied with the Taliban and has maintained its connection (as illustrated by the killing of Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul in July 2022), remain active in the country. The United Nations reports that Al-Qaeda has set up eight new training camps in Afghanistan in recent years.

The primary targets of ISIL-K’s activities are the Taliban themselves. For instance, in January 2023, a suicide bombing near the heavily fortified Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kabul claimed 20 lives. In early December 2024, a suicide attack took the life of Khalil Haqqani, the Taliban’s acting Minister for Refugees, marking one of the highest-profile casualties among their ranks since August 2021.

At the same time, the threat of terrorism is spilling over beyond Afghanistan’s borders. A notable example is the March 2024 terrorist attack in Moscow, which resulted in the deaths of 145 people, with ISIL-K claiming responsibility.

The lack of formal international recognition leads to further isolation and stagnation of the Taliban regime. Their inability to independently address security issues poses a persistent threat to Afghanistan’s neighbors and the entire world.

Ruslan Suleymanov

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