After gaining independence, the Central Asian countries experienced numerous upheavals, some even having rather dramatic consequences. However, the region has fortunately avoided a full-scale war between its neighbors. Despite the foreign experts constantly talking about large-scale military threats in the region, in fact it has become a true safe haven, where the possibility of war between states is a very unlikely prospect. On the other hand, however, internal conflicts based on the flawed nature of political institutions are much more likely to arise.

Weakness as an advantage

A conversation about the army of a particular state should begin with three factors: the type of statehood adopted in the country in question, the system of interstate relations in the region, and the place of the region or country in the global world.

According to the first criterion, Central Asian countries can be classified as the so-called weak states, which are characterized by the low efficiency of state institutions, the lack of consensus on the overarching idea being implemented in the country, and the fragmentation of society, where each social group (ethnic, religious, group of influence) acts as one of many centers of power.

Another important criterion for weak states is the broken monopoly of the state on legal violence. This in turn means that a significant part of resources has to be spent on preventing more serious problems. There have also been many cases when states lost control over the situation in the history of independence. These are the civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1997), three Kyrgyz revolutions (2005, 2010, and 2020), clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Osh, and finally riots in Almaty in January 2022. In addition, a substantial number of smaller episodes can be recalled – for example, local battles in the village of Koi-Tash, when the former President of Kyrgyzstan Almazbek Atambayev tried to resist arrest in his residence, as well as riots in Andijan (2005) and Nukus (2022). 

Perhaps this is why the Military Doctrine of Kyrgyzstan – the champion in the number of armed incidents – specifically highlights internal military dangers. The latter include: “attempts to undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order using destructive, separatist or other aggressive forces”; “attempts to exacerbate interethnic tensions”; “The expansion of radical religious movements that can lead to an increase in the number of ethnic conflicts and manifestations of separatism.”

A special emphasis on internal security issues is also reflected in the fact that police and paramilitary forces, such as the Internal Troops or the National Guard, constitute a significant portion of the armed forces of Central Asian countries. In Kazakhstan, at the beginning of 2024, such forces, according to the statistical compendium The Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), account for about 32% of all military strength, while in Kyrgyzstan – 22%, in Tajikistan – 46%, in Turkmenistan – 27%, and in Uzbekistan – 29%.

For quite a while, the development of the region from a military point of view has been determined by another factor: the five post-Soviet republics did not consider each other as potential adversaries until the border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan arose in 2021-2022. Maintaining peace and military security in Central Asia does not occur through achieving a balance of power – rather, it is built on the basis of the weakness of states and the formation of a specific version of a pluralistic security community. It stems from the fact that all Central Asian states share the “Westphalian” norms of international relations (the principles of the inviolability of borders, sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs). A similar situation, according to the research of Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, was developing in Africa in the 1980s.

The commitment of the Central Asian countries to the “Westphalian” norms is recorded in a number of conceptual and doctrinal documents, such as military doctrines. For example, the Defense Doctrine of Uzbekistan, adopted in 2018, states that the country “builds relations with all countries  taking into account the universally recognized principles and norms of international law, mutual benefit, equality, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, the settlement of all disputes by peaceful means and through negotiations, the recognition of the inviolability and immutability of the existing interstate borders.”

In addition, collective security in Central Asia is also enshrined at the level of international treaties, which also form something close to the security community. The key agreement here was the Collective Security Treaty, signed in 1992 and which entered into force in 1994 for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. According to this treaty, “The participating states confirm the obligation to refrain from the use of force or the threat of using force in inter-state relations. They pledge to resolve all differences between themselves and other states by peaceful means.”

At the moment, the CSTO (an organization formed in 2002 on the basis of the Collective Security Treaty), along with Armenia, Belarus, and Russia, includes three Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In addition, all Central Asian countries remain members of the CIS Joint Air Defense System (although Turkmenistan’s participation is considered only formal). A portion of the Russian military is also stationed in certain Central Asian countries: in Kyrgyzstan (about 500 military personnel, 13 Su-25SM aircraft and two Mi-8 helicopters at the Kant airbase) and Tajikistan (about 3 thousand military personnel, four Mi-24P helicopters, six Mi-8MTV helicopters and eight S-300-PS complexes at the 201st military base).

Peripheral region

At the global level, the military security of the Central Asian countries is ensured by the general remoteness of the region and relatively low interest in the military security of the countries from the global powers and related organizations. Of course, it would be wrong to say there is complete indifference. Central Asia becomes a point of interest situationally, for example, during the antiterrorist operation “Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan (2001-2014). 

The countries are quite actively involved in the affairs of international organizations such as the OSCE and NATO, and participate in military exercises, including with extra-regional players. However, it is much more interesting to talk about other, less obvious ways to cooperate.

For example, in 2024, cooperation with Azerbaijan – a country with successful experience in real military operations with active use of drones and electronic warfare (EW) forces – has skyrocketed. Also, according to The Military Balance, there have been about 300 servicemen of the National Liberation Army of China present in Tajikistan since 2020. Moreover, certain media even mention the presence of a Chinese military base or outpost in Tajikistan. However, this data is not confirmed by either the Chinese or the Tajik sides. 

Some Central Asian countries are quite actively involved in peacekeeping activities carried out under the auspices of the UN. Of them all, Kazakhstan is the most prolific in this regard, as at the beginning of 2024, the country was represented in missions in the Central African Republic (1 person), Lebanon (9 people) and Western Sahara (6 people), and since March 2024, the peacekeeping contingent of the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan consisting of 139 servicemen has been carrying out an independent mission in the Golan Heights. The Kyrgyz military is involved in missions under the auspices of the UN in South Sudan (2 people) and Sudan (2 people).

Talking about real military threats, those were traditionally expected from Afghanistan, and until the end of the 1990s, Tajikistan was also considered as such. However in both cases, it was not the state itself that was perceived as hostile, but rather the irregular armed formations operating on its territory. This largely determined the strategy of military development in the Central Asian countries: the emphasis was put on the formation of a “small, but mobile, well-equipped professional army with modern weapons and military equipment, capable of reliably ensuring security both independently and in cooperation with the armed forces of other states”.  The effectiveness of this strategy was tested – to a certain extent – during the Batken events of 1999 when insurgents of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) infiltrated the territory of Kyrgyzstan, as well as in other episodes of the fight against gangs.

The possibility of a military conflict between the Central Asian states was officially acknowledged only once, in 2012. During his visit to Kazakhstan, President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov noted that the shortage of water resources could worsen to the point where the countries would be ready to fight for control over the situation.

Tense times

A new perspective on national security issues began to emerge after 2014, when a key partner for all the countries in the region—Russia—moved away from the unconditional adherence to “Westphalian” norms. Many experts interpreted the situation in Crimea and Donbas in this way. The year 2022 also brought changes – not because of Ukraine, but because of the border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.  Clashes had occurred there before, of course, but this time the situation was much more serious, prompting discussions about the possibility of an “arms race.”

It cannot be said that the countries of the region have truly begun to re-equip on a large scale, however, according to the statistical compendium The Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), an increase in military (defense) budgets in 2023 can be observed in at least three countries (data for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan is not available). In Kazakhstan, the defense budget increased by 1.35 times compared to 2022 (from $1.87 to $2.53 billion), while the trend of increasing the defense budget was already present in 2022 (from $1.54 to $1.88 billion, which is by 1.22 times). In Tajikistan, the defense budget increased by 1.31 times: from $108 million to $141 million. At the same time, the trend towards an increase in the budget here has been going on since at least 2017, but until 2023 it was going quite steady (for example, in 2022, compared to 2021, the budget increased by 1.14 times, and in 2021, compared to 2020, by 1.05 times). There is no data for Kyrgyzstan, but it has been noted that the budget there is expected to “significantly increase.”

Curiously, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has recorded a different dynamic (it uses, however, a different unit of comparison – not the “absolute” dollar, but the “constant 2022 dollar”). According to the institute’s findings, Kazakhstan’s military spending has been declining since 2019. So, if in 2022 military expenditures amounted to $1163.1 million in “2022 dollars”, then in 2023 – to $1062.7 million (a decrease of 1.09 times). In Tajikistan, after a sharp increase in military expenses in 2022 (2.04 times, from $100.1 million to $2003.9 million), there has been a significant decrease to $132 million (1.54 times) in 2023. A steady increase in military expenses is recorded only in Kyrgyzstan. If in 2021 it amounted to $300.9 million, then in 2022 – to $352.1 million, and in 2023 to $433.6 million. As with the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute does not provide systematic data for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Regarding Uzbekistan, over the past 10 years, only figures for 2018 are given ($1678.9 million in “2022 dollars”, or 3.56% of GDP).

The specific breakdown of defense budgets in Central Asian countries is typically not provided. For example, the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On the Republican Budget for 2024-2026” in the “Defense” class provides a breakdown only by ministries. At the same time, the Ministry of Defense has only two subclasses: “Services for determining and implementing state policy in the field of defense organization and the Armed Forces” and “Ensuring the combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces”. 

In terms of available weapons and military equipment, the armed forces continue to be dominated by Russian (Soviet) production. The tank fleet consists of T-62, T-64, T-72, and T-90 vehicles of various modifications. The combat aircraft fleet includes MiG-23, MiG-29, MiG-31, Su-25, Su-27, and Su-30 aircraft of various modifications, along with Mi-8, Mi-17, Mi-24, Mi-26, and Mi-35 helicopters. A much greater variety of manufacturing countries is represented in the secure patrol vehicles and armored personnel carriers sector. In this category, Uzbekistan alone operates vehicles from Turkish (Ejder Yalcin), American (MaxxPro+, Cougar, and M-ATV), and Russian (Typhoon-K and Tigr-M) production. Additionally, domestic models of armored personnel carriers and lightly armored vehicles are used in both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
If we considering the size of the armed forces in Central Asian countries, the figures have not changed for a long time and at the beginning of 2024, according to The Military Balance, they were as follows:

The number of personnel in Kazakhstan’s Armed Forces is estimated at 39,000 (including: army – 20,000, navy – 3,000, air force – 12,000, Ministry of Defense personnel – 4,000). With a broader understanding of the Armed Forces, an additional 31,500 police officers and paramilitary personnel can be included (including about 20,000 National Guard members and about 9,000 Border Troops).

The number of personnel in Kyrgyzstan’s Armed Forces is estimated at 10,900 (including: army – 8,500, air force – 2,400). With a broader understanding of the Armed Forces, an additional 9,500 police officers and paramilitary personnel can be included (including 1,000 National Guard members, 3,500 Internal Troops, and 5,000 Border Troops).

The number of personnel in Tajikistan’s Armed Forces is estimated at 8,800 (including: army – 7,300, air force and air defense – 1,500). With a broader understanding of the Armed Forces, an additional 7,500 police officers and paramilitary personnel can be included (including 1,200 National Guard members, 3,800 Internal Troops, and 2,500 personnel from the Ministry of Emergency Situations).

The number of personnel in Turkmenistan’s Armed Forces is estimated at 36,500 (including: army – 33,000, navy – 500, air force – 3,000). With a broader understanding of the Armed Forces, an additional 20,000 police officers and paramilitary personnel can be included (including about 15,000 Internal Troops and about 5,000 Border Troops).

The number of personnel in Uzbekistan’s Armed Forces is estimated at 48,000 (including: army – 24,500, air force – 7,500, Ministry of Defense personnel – 4,000, and joint formations – 16,000). With a broader understanding of the Armed Forces, an additional 20,000 police officers and paramilitary personnel can be included (including about 1,000 National Guard members and about 19,000 Internal Security Forces).

 But more important than the number of personnel is the presence of officers in the army with any combat experience. Such officers are scarse, except perhaps in Tajikistan, where the experience of the civil war is still fresh. The rest of the region’s armies can safely be called ‘training ground’ armies — they have never faced real combat tasks, and all their knowledge has been acquired exclusively through exercises. In this context, attempts to build ‘military power rankings’ in Central Asia make little sense.