For over three years since the Taliban took over Afghanistan, Beijing has emerged as one of their key foreign policy partners. The Chinese government was the first in the world to accept credentials from a Taliban-appointed ambassador. Their close ties are not only due to geographical proximity but also stem from China’s significant economic interests in Afghanistan. Although the two countries share a border, a direct road linking them has yet to be constructed, but plans are underway. This proposed route would navigate through the 300-kilometer Wakhan Corridor, currently home only to nomadic shepherds.

Challenges of Recognition

In August 2021, China stood out as one of the few countries that chose not to evacuate its embassy in Kabul when Taliban militants took control. Shortly after, the Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed willingness to engage in dialogue with the new interim government established by the Taliban.

With a shared 91-kilometer border, Beijing had a vested interest in collaborating with Kabul even during the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA), particularly in the economic arena. According to the National Statistics and Information Authority of the IRA, China emerged as the second-largest supplier of goods to Afghan consumers in 2020, with a total trade volume of $986.5 million, following Iran.

Since the Taliban regained control in September 2021, representatives from both the Taliban government and Chinese officials have held regular consultations. Notably, in March 2022, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi became the fifth foreign minister to visit Kabul since the Taliban took power.

Afghan Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi welcomes Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Kabul / March 2023
Photo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan

While China has not formally recognized the Taliban-led government, it made a significant move in September 2023 by appointing a new ambassador to Kabul—the first official ambassador sent since the Taliban regime was established. In contrast, Russian Ambassador Dmitry Zhirnov received his credentials from the previous authorities. Furthermore, in January 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping accepted the credentials from Bilal Karimi, the ambassador designated by the Taliban in Beijing. This marked, in effect, a de facto recognition of the Taliban regime’s legitimacy by a permanent member of the UN Security Council. 

More than just business

The economic landscape serves as the primary catalyst for the relations between Afghanistan and China. It primarily focuses on Afghanistan’s abundant mineral resources, which have attracted significant interest from Chinese enterprises. Besides, Chinese products are frequently observed in Afghan markets, indicating a robust presence.

China sent the first batch of cargo to Afghanistan via land route / Torkham Checkpoint (Afghan-Pakistani border) / September 2023
Photo: Sputnik Afghanistan

By the end of 2023, China emerged as the third-largest supplier to Afghanistan, accounting for around 15% of all imports. Only Iran, at 23%, and Pakistan, at 19%, surpassed China’s contributions.

At the beginning of 2023, the Chinese company CAPEIC entered into a significant 25-year agreement with the Taliban to commence oil production, pledging an annual investment of $150 million in Afghanistan.

Copper mining also presents a lucrative opportunity for China, with Afghanistan’s reserves potentially exceeding 4 billion tons. In 2007, Chinese firms Jiangxi Copper and the Metallurgical Corporation of China secured a $3 billion tender to develop a copper deposit in Logar Province. Plans were laid out to build essential infrastructure in the area, including a railway and a power plant, but these projects have yet to materialize. The Mes Aynak mine, with copper reserves estimated at around 11 million tons, stands as the second largest in the world.

Photo: Sputnik Afghanistan

In July 2024, a notable ribbon-cutting ceremony attended by Taliban representatives and Chinese business leaders marked the start of road construction to the mine. Chinese officials regarded this event as a “significant step” forward.

However, the execution of these projects within Afghanistan faces ongoing challenges due to security issues. According to the Australian Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), which tracks the Global Terrorism Index, terrorist attacks in the country dropped by 75% in 2022 compared to the previous year. Nonetheless, Afghanistan continues to hold the unfortunate title of being the most dangerous country in terms of terrorism.

Nomads and glaciers

One of the most challenging issues in Kabul—Beijing’s relationship is the Wakhan Corridor. Situated at the crossroads of historic trade routes, many experts call this passage the “strategic core” of Eurasia.

The corridor resembles a narrow tail, stretching over 300 kilometers long and up to 64 kilometers wide. It serves as a buffer zone between Pakistan and Tajikistan, eventually leading to a 92-kilometer border with the sprawling Chinese province of Xinjiang. In the late 19th century, the Wakhan Corridor functioned as a buffer zone, or “no man’s land,” between Tsarist Russia and British India, bordered by the Panj River to the north and an impassable mountain range to the south.

This rugged region is known for its towering peaks, glaciers, rocky riverbeds, and hot springs. The Amu Darya River, which flows through much of Central Asia, originates in this area, with most of the region situated nearly 5,000 meters above sea level.

Photo: Konstantin_Novakovic / istockphoto

The corridor has a population of about 13,000 and boasts a rich cultural heritage featuring various tribes that speak different languages. Notable communities include the Wakhs, Sarykulis (Chinese Wakhs), and Kyrgyz. The Wakhs and Sarykulis practice the Ismaili branch of Islam, while the Kyrgyz adhere to Sunni Islam.

Due to the harsh climate, all communities in the Wakhan Corridor lead a nomadic lifestyle. The road only reaches the village of Sarhad-e-Broghil, while tourist groups venture further—to Lake Chakmaktyn—on horseback or with yaks. Residents primarily rely on similar modes of transport.

The Wakhan Corridor holds significant strategic potential today, particularly for enhancing regional communications and trade. It also features vast reserves of drinking water.

This route could provide a more direct path to the Indian Ocean for landlocked Central Asian nations; for example, it offers the shortest route to Pakistan for Tajikistan. Additionally, Pakistan is eager to develop this route as it would connect with the China-Eurasian Economic Corridor, a key element of China’s broader One Belt, One Road initiative.

China has expressed considerable concern over extremist elements in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. By investing in infrastructure development in the Wakhan Corridor, Beijing aims to address some of these concerns.

However, developing the corridor requires overcoming several logistical challenges, starting with resolving the border situations among the countries vying for access to this vital route. Although the Chinese-Afghan border was officially established in 1963, no border checkpoints have been created between the two nations.

Regardless of the circumstances, all parties with access to the corridor share a strong interest in its development.

Road to China

The Taliban view the Wakhan Corridor as a potential direct trade route to Beijing. However, before 2021, this corridor was inaccessible due to the impassable South Wakhjir Davan mountain pass. Just a few months before the Taliban took control in May 2021, China began investing in infrastructure in the region, allocating over $5 million for a road construction project. This effort extended the road slightly towards the village of Bozai Gumbaz, but it remains a basic dirt track, unsuitable for regular travel.

After the Taliban’s takeover, construction was halted for nearly two years. In January 2024, Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban’s Deputy Prime Minister, announced that work on the road from Faizabad to the Chinese border had resumed. However, in August, Taliban officials provided conflicting messages about the project. Mohammad Yunus Akhundzada, the Minister of Rural Development, claimed the road would be completed “by winter,” while officials from Badakhshan stated it was already finished. Despite these assertions, there has been no official opening ceremony, and China has not indicated its readiness to utilize the route for trade.

One significant obstacle in developing the Wakhan Corridor is the tense relationship between the Taliban and the Pakistani government. Islamabad has expressed frustration over the activities of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, a group that has connections to the Taliban and frequently carries out attacks within Pakistan.

Pakistan has long sought access to the Wakhan Corridor to establish a direct route to Central Asia. However, in July 2022, Taliban forces disrupted these plans by launching attacks near Karambar Lake along the corridor, signaling that Pakistan and Tajikistan would have to rely on Chinese territory for their trade.

As a result, Pakistan is a crucial intermediary for Afghan-Chinese trade, serving as the main channel for goods and services moving between Kabul and Beijing. The Taliban’s strong position against Pakistan appears largely symbolic, intended to assert their authority and demonstrate their unwillingness to compromise on border matters, especially after Pakistani border guards attempted to exert control over parts of the corridor.

The Taliban are eager to enhance economic cooperation with the international community. The Wakhan Corridor offers a valuable opportunity to strengthen ties with both China and Pakistan, suggesting that their stance on this issue may soften over time.

Despite the potential for development, unresolved challenges regarding security, logistics, and the establishment of proper border checkpoints continue to hinder the corridor’s viability. For now, it remains a long way from becoming an operational trade link between Afghanistan, China, and other neighboring countries in the region.