In June, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and China finally signed an agreement to build a railway connecting these countries. This was a significant move, as the project had been discussed for years, mentioned in political speeches, but never saw significant progress. The railway could empower the region’s independence from Russia and create a more competitive environment, as currently, all railway connections between Central Asia and China are controlled by Kazakhstan.

Oasis lands

To understand why these three countries took so long to coordinate the railway project, it’s worth first to recall geography of Central Asia. Moreover, it is better to consider the region in a wider context: not just the five post-Soviet republics, but also Afghanistan, the western part of China (Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region), Iran, and even the South Caucasus – a land bridge to Türkiye and the Arab countries.

This vast territory is divided into smaller oases, which historically fueled the region’s development. These oases can be literal – fertile zones irrigated amid deserts or arid steppes – or metaphorical, serving as centers of trade, science, and culture surrounded by nomadic lands. Notable among these hubs are the Ferghana Valley (Andijan, Osh, Kokand), the Syr Darya Valley (Tashkent, Shymkent, Turkestan), Khorezm (Urgench, Dashoguz), Semirechye (Almaty, Bishkek), the Zarafshan Valley (Samarkand, Navoi, Bukhara), Turkmen oases (Ashgabat, Mary), and others.

For thousands of years, these regions were the centers of Central Asian states, overtaking each other in leadership. The Silk Road passed through them, making the region a crossroads of Eurasia. Caravans traveled both westward and eastward, carrying knowledge, technology, culture, and religions. However, around 500 years ago, maritime trade routes began to dominate, which led to the decline of Central Asia as it lost both a source of income and new ideas.

The gradual expansion of the Russian Empire into the region further disrupted historical connections. Essentially, only one developed transportation route remained: the northern route. This included roads and pipelines connecting Central Asia to Russia. Trade with China was mainly conducted through Russia’s Far East (such as Kyakhta, where a blend of Russian and Chinese languages emerged), rather than through Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan.

The southern route – into Afghanistan – was initially underdeveloped due to British influence, and later, due to ongoing instability. During Uzbekistan’s independence, a significant project was implemented: the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif railway, which has the potential to become a full-fledged Trans-Afghan route. Only after 1991 were rail connections established between Turkmenistan and Iran. Before this, trade with Iran was conducted through Soviet Azerbaijan (Julfa station).

Ferry connections across the Caspian Sea between the western and eastern shores (Turkmenbashi–Baku) have existed for many years. However, making the trans-Caspian route China–Kazakhstan–Azerbaijan–Georgia– Türkiye suitable for large-scale international trade requires further effort. The railway from Kashgar to Andijan, which we are discussing, is a step in that direction.

Mountainous gateways

After gaining independence, direct transport links with China became crucial for Central Asian countries, particularly due to China’s rapid economic growth. However, the Tien Shan and Pamir Mountain ranges posed significant barriers, leaving only a few potential routes.

In Tajikistan, despite having a long border with China, there is only one crossing point – “Kulma-Karasu.” It is far from Dushanbe and operates for just 3-4 months a year due to weather conditions. As a result, even Tajikistan often uses the neighboring Kyrgyzstan’s “Irkeshtam” crossing for transit. While the road is currently only for vehicles, a branch of the Central Asia–China gas pipeline is being constructed alongside it. Uzbekistan also uses this route – its trucks travel from Andijan through Osh and Gulcha to Irkeshtam. However, this path is challenging, crossing several mountain passes. Another difficulty for Tajikistan is the inability to use the Karamyk checkpoint on the border with Kyrgyzstan for international transportation, as it has bilateral rather than international status. If this route were opened as well, the way to China (to the same Irkeshtam) would be much closer and by a direct road.

Kazakhstan, however, holds a privileged position in terms of access to China. It hosts the well-known “Khorgos” crossing, which includes both a railway and gas pipelines. Another railway and road crossing, Dostyk–Alashankou, or the Dzungarian Gate, lies further north. This natural gap in the mountain chain has been a passageway for centuries. In 1969, a shootout between Soviet and Chinese border guards led to its closure until 1991, reflecting how Central Asia wasn’t considered an important transit region during Soviet times. News of a third railway crossing being built at Bakhty on the Kazakhstan-China border has also surfaced, which currently serves as a road crossing.

Thus, Kazakhstan not only has the most border crossings (including smaller ones like “Kolzhat”) but also holds a monopoly over railway freight. The new China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway will break this monopoly, significantly enhancing Tashkent’s role as an independent economic player. Currently, about 40% of the revenue of Kazakhstan’s railways comes from transit to Uzbekistan.

Photo: Marat Nadjibaev

Kyrgyzstan’s hesitations

The idea of building a railway from Uzbekistan to Kashgar in China has been around for a long time. However, several obstacles delayed its realization. Xinjiang remained one of China’s least developed regions for a long time, and a railway to Kashgar was only constructed in 2000. Additionally, differences in track gauges between China and the former Soviet Union and debates over the route and funding further complicated progress.

The exact cost of such an extensive project will likely only be known upon its completion. Constructing roads in mountainous areas often leads to unforeseen expenses. Nevertheless, Kyrgyzstan’s Prime Minister Akylbek Japarov and the Asian Development Bank’s Director General for Central and West Asia, Yevgeny Zhukov, mentioned an estimate of $8 billion. Even this sum is beyond the means of both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, so the railway will be built on credit. Half the funds will come from China, while the other half will be provided by a joint venture (JV) that will control the route until the project is finished. Essentially, this means it is still Chinese money since Beijing holds a 51% stake in the JV.

Since most of the route passes through Kyrgyzstan, the country will bear a larger share of the loan and financial obligations. Profit for Bishkek from the project can only be realized after the route comes under its direct control. This financial burden was a long-standing issue in implementing the project. The justification for Kyrgyzstan finally became the chosen route, which allows Kyrgyzstan to connect the northern and southern parts of its railway network, which are currently separate.

Now that the railway construction agreement is signed, we know it will stretch approximately 500 kilometers, 300 of which will pass through Kyrgyzstan. The railway will run from Andijan in Uzbekistan to Jalal-Abad, then turn southeast near the Kumtor gold mine towards the “Torugart” checkpoint on the Chinese border. The transition from the Russian to Chinese (European) gauge will be equipped in the Makmal area, which is a national security requirement for Uzbekistan. A branch line to Kochkor and Balykchy is also planned, connecting Bishkek and Osh by rail, significantly changing Kyrgyzstan’s logistics.

However, Bishkek itself will have to build this branch, and given that it is 250-300 kilometers through the mountains, the cost may be quite comparable to the Andijan-Kashgar road. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan is paying a loan of 850 million dollars for the North-South highway, which has not yet been put into operation, although it was supposed to be ready in 2018. 

In case of any delay, or even more so in case of the project’s failure, Bishkek will find itself in an extremely unpleasant situation: all its expenses may end up being unjustified. The risks for Uzbekistan and China, in turn, are minimal, if they exist at all. The road from Andijan to the Kyrgyz border still exists today, and China, although it gives a loan, de facto shifts money from one pocket to another. Knowing China’s working methods in Latin America or Africa, there is no doubt that Chinese companies will get the main construction contracts.

Risks and opportunities

Despite the immense funds to be invested, the mountainous terrain will still limit the new route’s capacity. It will be a single-track, non-electrified railway with a maximum load of 20–25 tons per wagon (in other conditions, it could be 60–70 tons). Additional locomotives might be required on steep sections. Yet, if completed successfully, all parties stand to benefit. The new railway will be much shorter than the route through Kazakhstan and can be immediately utilized for transporting Kyrgyzstan’s minerals.

Initially, there were objections from Russia and Kazakhstan. 

Kazakhstan was reluctant to lose its monopoly on railway connections to China. However, as relations between Tashkent and Astana improved, Kazakhstan agreed to forgo transit revenue between Uzbekistan and China in exchange for increased bilateral trade and overall transit to Europe. In Russia, it was once believed that the railway would shift Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan’s focus to China as their primary economic and political partner. However, analysis of Central Asian republics’ actions over the years shows that they aim to maintain a multi-vector policy.

The project also affects Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Turkmenistan views it positively, as it may eventually increase traffic to the Turkmenbashi port. In contrast, Tajikistan likely preferred a different route through Irkeshtam, which would allow a future rail link from Dushanbe. Now, this hope has faded, and Tajikistan’s economy is increasingly reliant on Uzbekistan for northern, eastern, and western transit. The southern route remains nearly closed, as Tajikistan is in no rush to engage with the Taliban.
Reaching an agreement on the railway construction reflects Tashkent’s successful foreign policy. Under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s eight-year leadership, the country has transformed from an “isolated fortress” to a key driver of regional development. The developments in Central Asia, in turn, influence China’s plans for Xinjiang, where a major logistics center is being constructed in Kashgar. Thanks to the railway loop through the Taklamakan Desert, the region now has the potential to become a global transit point.