30 Years of neutrality. Where Turkmenistan’s foreign policy stands on its milestone anniversary

“Neutrality” is the key term Turkmen authorities use to define their foreign policy. Even the country’s state newspaper is titled “Neutral Turkmenistan.” However, it would be naive to assume that this Central Asian republic, which will mark the 30th anniversary of its official neutrality in 2025, has not shifted its priorities over the years or has genuinely maintained a balanced stance on the global stage. Andrey Kazantsev, a research fellow at the Eurasian National University in Kazakhstan and Bar-Ilan University in Israel, closely examined the intricacies of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy exclusively for POLITIK Central Asia. His analysis provides valuable insights into the deeper implications of the country’s declared neutrality.

Rooted in a UN Resolution

Turkmenistan’s foreign policy has its roots in 1995 when the country was granted the status of “permanent neutrality” by the UN General Assembly. In Resolution No. 50/80, UN member states “recognize and support the status of permanent neutrality proclaimed by Turkmenistan” and “express hope” that this decision will “contribute to strengthening peace and security in the region.” While this is a significant milestone in the nation’s history, its importance is often exaggerated in Ashgabat.

It’s crucial to understand that decisions made by the UN General Assembly are non-binding; they simply convey a stance on a particular matter. Moreover, the UN has no formal process for recognizing a country’s “permanent neutrality.” For example, Austria established its neutrality through a clear parliamentary decision in 1955. This distinction enables Turkmen propaganda to emphasize the country’s uniqueness, asserting that “History has never witnessed such precedents in the establishment (method and conditions of acquisition) of neutrality.”

Additionally, modern-day Turkmenistan often overlooks the concept of “positive neutrality,” primarily developed in the 1990s by former Foreign Affairs Minister Boris Shikhmuradov. In 2002, he was arrested on charges of plotting to assassinate President Saparmurat Niyazov, who was known as Turkmenbashi. He was later sentenced to life in prison. Following the judgment, he seemingly disappeared, but in 2004, a book titled “Myself and My Accomplices-Terrorists,” allegedly authored by him, appeared in bookstores. Few accepted that he was the true author, yet the idea he promoted still carries some significance today.

Another influence on the nation’s foreign policy style is Saparmurat Niyazov’s personality. He emphasized complete independence in decision-making, leading to a notable decrease in engagement with international organizations and other nations. This stance ultimately bolstered the authoritarianism that characterizes Turkmenistan today.

Gas: the backbone of strategy

During the Niyazov era, Turkmenistan began leveraging its vast natural gas reserves as a foreign policy tool. This approach aligned with the core economic idea behind Boris Shikhmuradov’s policy of positive neutrality. At the time, Turkmenistan was highly dependent on Russia’s Gazprom, which exploited its monopoly over Turkmen gas. Russia used this gas to supplement its supplies for increased European exports and redirect Turkmen gas through its territory to less lucrative markets, often involving barter deals, such as Ukraine. Ironically, this dynamic contributed to the political rise of Yulia Tymoshenko, who skillfully negotiated with Niyazov during her tenure as Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister.

Moscow’s primary objective was to prevent Ashgabat from realizing the ambitious Nabucco Pipeline Project. This pipeline would have allowed Central Asian countries to deliver hydrocarbons to Europe via the Caspian Sea, bypassing Russia. Discussions about the pipeline emerged in the early 2000s as the EU sought to diversify its energy sources. Due to its vast reserves, Turkmenistan was considered a key supplier, particularly in the Galkynysh field. The United States even appointed a special representative for Caspian energy projects, Steven Mann. However, in his memoirs, Mann admitted that “Niyazov’s unpredictability killed the Trans-Caspian Pipeline project, and Ashgabat’s investment-hostile policies continue to block its realization.”

The proposed pipeline beneath the Caspian Sea also faced strong opposition from Russia and Iran due to the unresolved legal status of the Caspian (the relevant document was signed only in 2018). Russia actively promoted alternative projects, such as the South Stream pipeline, to undermine the appeal of Nabucco. Looking ahead, it can be said that China’s intensified gas purchases from Turkmenistan played a key role in freezing the project, leaving the Trans-Caspian Pipeline unfulfilled.

Towards the end of Turkmenbashi’s presidency, a tragic series of events unfolded, largely stemming from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s fear of losing control over Turkmen gas. In April 2003, an agreement was reached that abolished the dual citizenship arrangement in place since 1993 between Turkmenistan and Russia. With this move, Turkmenbashi aimed to tighten his grip over the Russian-speaking population, where holding two passports had become commonplace among many Turkmen intellectuals and opposition figures.

This decision, however, turned out to be disastrous for countless Russian speakers following the assassination attempt on Turkmenbashi on November 25, 2002. A wave of mass repression swept the nation, and the security services began to suspect those with dual citizenship of being disloyal. The cancellation of the dual citizenship agreement led to numerous ethnic Russians and ethnic Turkmens, who held Russian citizenship in Turkmenistan, facing serious challenges, including loss of property rights, travel restrictions, and forced naturalization — that is, the requirement to obtain a Turkmen passport.

Moscow failed to extend any support to its citizens in this difficult situation, which sparked frustration among ethnic Russians and discontent within the Russian media. In desperation, many individuals tried reaching out through the feedback form on the Russian presidential website, kremlin.ru, only to have the site blocked in Turkmenistan as a result.

 The Turkmen thaw

Following Niyazov’s passing, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, his successor, implemented a more open foreign policy while still prioritizing neutrality as a core principle. Under his guidance, Turkmenistan enhanced its involvement with international organizations such as the UN. He promoted initiatives centered around energy, environmental challenges, and sustainable development. During his tenure, relationships strengthened with neighboring Central Asian countries, Iran, Afghanistan, Türkiye, and Western nations. Unlike Niyazov’s isolationist strategy, Berdimuhamedov worked towards normalizing ties with Moscow and even welcomed collaborative projects with Israeli investors like Yosef Maiman, who had robust connections in Azerbaijan across the Caspian Sea. While Niyazov had engaged in international initiatives, his isolationist stance limited progress. In contrast, Berdimuhamedov’s relatively increased openness produced concrete outcomes, including developing new export routes.

A significant milestone was the construction of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline, which significantly diminished Turkmenistan’s reliance on Russia’s Gazprom. To fund the development of the Turkmen section of this pipeline and the Galkynysh gas field, China extended loans totaling around $8 billion. Turkmenistan committed to supplying natural gas to China as a means to repay this debt, effectively establishing a “resources for investment” partnership. Many Western experts now characterize such loans from Beijing as a form of neo-colonialism.

Berdimuhamedov’s foreign policy actively sought foreign investment, particularly in the energy sector and infrastructure development. However, this sometimes sparked conflicts, as seen with the Belarusians involved in constructing the Garlyk Mining and Processing Plant or with the Russian operator MTS, whose assets were seized on the grounds of alleged violations of local laws.

This treatment of investors, even from neighboring countries, reveals much about governance in Ashgabat. Yet, amidst a highly favorable foreign economic climate, Berdimuhamedov concentrated on ambitious gas projects, highlighting Turkmenistan’s significance in the global energy arena. Angela Merkel even recognized this influence when she hosted Berdimuhamedov in Berlin in 2016.

The son of his father

Since taking office in 2022, Serdar Berdimuhamedov, the son of Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, has largely continued his father’s foreign policy traditions. However, some new aspects have emerged that hint at a return to the era of Turkmenbashi.

Under Serdar’s leadership, Ashgabat has capitalized on the trend towards stronger intraregional ties initiated mainly by Astana and Tashkent. This has enhanced connections with neighboring countries through regional trade, joint infrastructure, and transportation projects. Notably, Ashgabat has increased its participation in Central Asian integration after a period of withdrawal driven by concerns over its neutrality.

In response to the country’s deepening economic challenges, Serdar has prioritized attracting foreign investment and technology, particularly in gas, agriculture, and transport sectors. Also, global trends and recommendations from international organizations have prompted Turkmenistan to take a more active role in initiatives focused on environmental sustainability. For instance, in 2023, Turkmenistan joined the Global Methane Commitment (GMP), demonstrating its dedication to reducing methane emissions. The country also proposed establishing a center in Ashgabat to promote the adoption of climate technologies across Central Asia and enhance the region’s resilience to climate change. In 2024, Ashgabat hosted the International Scientific Conference on “Energy Prospects, New Technologies, and Environmental Aspects of Hydrocarbon Resource Development” (TESC 2024), highlighting Turkmenistan’s environmental initiatives and contributions to energy security.

Before Berdimuhamedov Sr. stepped down in June 2021, Turkmenistan ultimately paid off the loans from China that had financed the construction of a gas pipeline to China and the development of the Galkynysh gas field. Although the exact amount of debt repaid was not disclosed, it was previously reported to be around $8.1 billion. This repayment eased some economic pressure from China, but it also left Turkmenistan increasingly reliant on gas exports to China, which dominate the country’s bilateral trade. By 2023, trade turnover with China had surpassed $10.5 billion, significantly outpacing trade with Russia or the EU.

Moreover, the reduction of economic pressure from Beijing has been complemented by intensified cooperation with Russia across trade, credit, and even military-political fronts—this includes informal security guarantees against threats arising from Afghanistan. Initially, Turkmenistan had pivoted towards China to escape Gazprom’s monopoly. However, as the risks associated with this monopoly have lessened, gas supplies to Russia resumed in 2019. Although supplies were halted again in the fall of 2024 due to pricing disputes, these challenges will likely be temporary.

Following the imposition of extensive international sanctions against Moscow in 2022, Russia has been eager to reinforce its ties with Central Asian nations, including Turkmenistan. Gazprom has shown interest in leveraging Turkmen infrastructure for gas exports to China. Nevertheless, Ashgabat is cautious, drawing on past experiences and firmly believing it needs to manage its infrastructure independently.

Tradition–driven diplomacy

The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in 2021 reduced Western influence in the region and limited Turkmenistan’s ability to balance between major powers. During the period of particularly active US engagement in Central Asia, there were even discussions about the possibility of using the “Mary-2” airport. Although the matter never progressed beyond preliminary talks, it provided Turkmen authorities with a certain leverage in negotiations with both the Americans and their geopolitical opponents.

Economic cooperation with China and Russia is also far more significant for Turkmenistan in terms of volume than with Western countries. The onset of the war in Ukraine in 2022 prompted Moscow to closely monitor the foreign policies of its neighbors, aiming to prevent them from drawing closer to the West.

Nonetheless, despite the increasing influence of Russia and China, Turkmenistan is striving to maintain its stance of neutrality. The country is actively working to revive projects with Western partners, such as the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. However, aside from mere rhetoric, tangible progress on this front has yet to materialize.

In July 2023, Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that there were no barriers to constructing the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, highlighting its economic viability and contributions to Eurasian energy security. By March 2024, Turkmenistan proposed the transportation of natural gas to Türkiye via the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan, citing the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, which permits the laying of pipelines on the seabed with the consent of neighboring states.

Many experts believed that Serdar Berdimuhamedov, much like his father, would initially embrace a policy of moderate liberalization to build public support before eventually cracking down. Reforms in neighboring Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan further fueled such hopes.

However, these expectations proved misplaced. There was no recurrence of the “Turkmen thaw” seen during the tenure of the elder Berdimuhamedov. Instead, a trend towards state conservatism has intensified in Turkmenistan, albeit somewhat softened by a focus on international projects, including educational and cultural initiatives aimed at engaging the younger generation.

Under Serdar Berdimuhamedov, state control over public and private life has been further strengthened. For example, the ban on women using cosmetics, eyelash extensions, hair dyeing, and other procedures that do not correspond to the approved appearance has been tightened. There have been cases when female civil servants have been checked for compliance with “norms of behavior” for their appearance and posts on social networks. It has become more difficult for citizens of the country, especially women, to obtain permission to leave the country. Control over the Internet has been tightened, especially for young people. Educational institutions, including schools and universities, have been infused with ideology, mandating the study of Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov’s works.

Formally, all this is justified by nationalist rhetoric on the part of the state leadership and is associated with domestic political considerations. However, there’s also an important aspect related to their foreign policy. This approach shows a growing trend toward conservative values and a strong focus on “traditional values,” which aligns with the interests of Turkmenistan’s key partners outside the region, especially Russia and, to a lesser extent, China and Türkiye.

Such actions increase Turkmenistan’s isolation and alienate the West, for which human rights and gender equality issues are considered important elements of the international agenda. However, with the decline of Western influence in the region following the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan and the start of a full-scale war in Ukraine, Turkmenistan can afford to pursue a more consistent policy with its neighbors rather than with the international liberal agenda. Thus, the conservative policy of the Turkmen leadership towards women and social norms, in turn, can be seen as a way to minimize cultural contradictions with the Taliban and strengthen trust in bilateral relations. The same logic can apply to the Iranian leadership.

Despite the differences in the nature of authoritarian regimes, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Afghanistan can find common ground within the framework of a common rhetoric about protecting “traditional values” from external influence, which facilitates the search for joint solutions to regional issues.

Turkmenistan has taken a pragmatic position regarding the Taliban, refusing to criticize the regime and has begun to establish contacts with it (however, the neighboring countries had ties with the Taliban even when the republican government was in Kabul). Afghanistan remains an important partner in the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) gas pipeline project and for transport corridors through South Asia. Its construction in Afghanistan began quite recently, in December 2024.

Maintaining good relations with the Taliban is important for Ashgabat, as Afghanistan is seeking a larger share of the water from the Amu Darya River. This situation could lead to serious consequences for Turkmenistan and worsen the environmental crisis already affecting the Aral Sea area in Uzbekistan. If this issue isn’t addressed, it could lead to increased tensions in the coming years.

Thus, in the context of global crises (pandemic, Russian-Ukrainian war, escalation of the confrontation between China and the United States, conflicts in the Middle East), Turkmenistan, under its third president, is partially returning to some practices from the times of Saparmurat Niyazov.

• Firstly, just like during the time of Turkmenbashi, Turkmenistan is currently unable to carry out large-scale energy and transport projects due to challenging international circumstances.

• Secondly, there is significant influence from non-Western entities during his administration and in the present day.

• Thirdly, the reinforcement of state conservatism (which had been somewhat relaxed during the initial liberal reforms of Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov’s tenure) has greatly influenced foreign relations both then and now.

Meanwhile, the principle of neutrality, despite the evident adaptability of Turkmen foreign policy, remains constant, and the Ashgabat authorities seem willing to reinterpret it in various ways as long as they can maintain the facade that Turkmenistan’s leaders favor.

Andrei Kazantsev

Research Fellow at the Eurasian National University in Kazakhstan and Bar-Ilan University in Israel

• #Popular