The BRICS summit that took place in Kazan in October marked the most significant international gathering in Russia since the onset of the full-scale conflict in Ukraine. The presence of around two dozen world leaders to meet with President Vladimir Putin amid Western attempts to isolate Russia highlighted the willingness of many nations in the Global South to engage with Moscow. . Leaders from five Central Asian states also made their way to the meeting in Tatarstan’s capital. Some were even offered the chance to join the BRICS group, which has embraced an anti-Western stance in recent years, but they politely declined the opportunity. Interestingly, those who have not been invited to join the alliance themselves did not express a desire to participate either. POLITIK Central Asia explored the reasons behind the willingness of regional leaders to engage in discussions with BRICS members while demonstrating reluctance to pursue formal membership in the group.

Threshold not crossed

The expansion of BRICS membership was expected to be a major highlight of Russia’s 2024 chairmanship. At the Kazan summit, it was believed that leaders from Russia, China, Brazil, India, and South Africa would be joined by heads of state from Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE as new full members. Furthermore, organizers planned to announce new members, possibly including Türkiye, Venezuela, Bangladesh, Belarus, and Azerbaijan. This impressive roster of international guests was intended to dispel the perception of Russia’s isolation, a notion promoted by Western countries since the large-scale conflict with Ukraine emerged in February 2022.

Russian propaganda monitored the situation closely. According to independent media sources, the Kremlin issued directives to television channels, urging journalists to frame Vladimir Putin as the “informal leader” of BRICS and to repeatedly emphasize that the number of global leaders visiting Russia caused “panic” and “concern” in the West. Additionally, Putin’s proposal at the summit to develop a currency alternative to the dollar and euro, along with the BRICS Bridge payment system, was intended to evoke “serious concern” among the United States and Europe.

However, on the summit’s first day, it became clear that things weren’t unfolding as planned. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov announced that BRICS would not expand in 2024 and that interested nations would only receive partner status. This status was granted to countries that seemed less than enthusiastic about it—namely, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Notably, prior to the summit, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had been invited to apply for BRICS membership but chose to decline, attending the summit instead. He rationalized his decision by stating that Kazakhstan is already engaged in numerous structures alongside Russia, China, India, Türkiye, and other key partners, making duplicating efforts by joining BRICS unnecessary. Tokayev hinted that Astana prefers stable organizations like the UN, suggesting that BRICS lacks the maturity of a fully developed organization and functions more as a club of non-Western nations without concrete projects or clearly defined objectives.

Since its inception in 2006, BRICS has held regular summits, yet there have been few significant initiatives developed under its banner. The organization often garners attention only in the lead-up to its meetings, where representatives repeatedly claim that BRICS encompasses half of the world’s population, that its member economies collectively outstrip those of Western countries by a quarter, and that they occupy more territory than the U.S. and the EU put together.

Photo: Madina Nurman

Kazakhstan’s refusal to join BRICS seems to have displeased Moscow. Coincidentally, just days before the Kazan summit, Russia’s Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance (Rosselkhoznadzor) banned the import of flowers from Kazakhstan. Interestingly, Kazakhstan hardly grows flowers but began reselling them from the Netherlands, Poland, and Belgium to Russia following Western sanctions against Moscow. Thus, Kazakhstan’s decision not to join BRICS directly impacted Russian consumers.

Uzbekistan has also kept BRICS membership off its agenda. After the Kazan summit, Uzbek authorities stated that many of the organization’s initiatives seem premature, including Putin’s idea to replace the euro and dollar with an alternative currency.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan may exhibit more interest in joining BRICS. During the summit, pro-government media in these countries actively promoted the potential advantages that BRICS membership could offer. Nonetheless, neither Bishkek nor Dushanbe has yet attained even partner status within BRICS.

Turkmenistan’s President Serdar Berdimuhamedov also attended the Kazan summit. However, likely in line with Ashgabat’s official stance of neutrality in international affairs, he refrained from making bold statements regarding BRICS.

The lack of enthusiasm from Central Asian countries toward BRICS might be surprising, as they typically do not shy away from joining promising regional organizations or projects. Examples include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Organization of Turkic States. However, BRICS has yet to impress them as an established and fully developed structure.

It is likely that Central Asian countries are also put off by the fact that since the full-scale conflict in Ukraine began, the Kremlin has positioned BRICS as an alliance of Putin’s supporters, for whom anti-Western sentiments and the fight against so-called U.S. hegemony seem more important than fundamental norms of international law. This image is unlikely to appeal to Central Asian countries, constantly under Western suspicion of aiding Moscow in circumventing sanctions and acquiring dual-use goods.

The limited interest in the club among Central Asian countries may be surprising. Generally, these nations do not refuse membership in promising regional organizations or initiatives. For instance, they actively participate in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China’s “Belt and Road Initiative,” the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Organization of Turkic States. However, BRICS does not appear to them as a solid, well-defined organization.

Central Asian countries are likely uneasy about the Kremlin’s framing of BRICS as a coalition of Putin supporters, where anti-Western rhetoric and resistance to U.S. dominance overshadow fundamental principles of international law. This reality has become even less appealing for these nations, especially in light of the escalating conflict in Ukraine. They often find themselves under the Western spotlight, facing allegations of helping Moscow circumvent sanctions and acquire dual-use goods, making the situation even more delicate.

A photo op

The BRICS summit in Kazan may go down in history as the largest gathering of world leaders with Vladimir Putin since the escalation of the Ukraine conflict. Indeed, neither Western-imposed personal sanctions nor the International Criminal Court’s warrant for the Russian leader’s arrest deterred numerous state leaders from attending the summit in Tatarstan, which the Kremlin viewed as a diplomatic victory.

Photo: Sergey Bobilev / RIA Novosti

While there were no representatives from Western nations at the summit, the BRICS alliance was initially designed as a coalition of non-Western countries, so their absence didn’t diminish the overall importance of the event. Currently, BRICS accounts for 45% of the world’s population, with its member economies contributing over 28% of the global GDP. With Egypt, Iran, the UAE, and Ethiopia set to join on January 1, 2024, the bloc is positioning itself as a prominent platform for the Global South.

A vital aspect of the BRICS narrative is the belief that member states can chart their paths without Western oversight. Since the bloc’s formation, Russia has been a vocal critic of the West and a strong proponent of a multipolar world. As tensions have escalated between the U.S. and China, Beijing has increasingly aligned itself with this perspective, drawing it closer to Moscow.

However, advocating for a multipolar world does not mean that BRICS countries have severed ties with the West or primarily engage with one another. For many members, the EU and the U.S. remain crucial partners and have no intention of undermining these relationships. Even China and Russia, often at the forefront of anti-Western rhetoric, maintain trade connections with the EU and the U.S.

Interestingly, some nations have opted out of BRICS membership due to its growing anti-Western tone. Argentina serves as a prime example. While it had initially agreed to join at last year’s summit in Johannesburg, the new president, Javier Milei, reversed that decision. In a letter to BRICS members, he articulated that an anti-American and anti-Western approach contradicted Argentina’s national interests.

Saudi Arabia’s status within BRICS remains uncertain. Although Riyadh received an invitation to join in 2023, it has yet to respond definitively.

The Russian Foreign Ministry claims that Saudi Arabia participated in the Kazan summit as a full member because it had been invited and did not decline. However, Saudi officials maintain that they attended merely as observers. Notably, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman skipped the event, and the foreign minister did not sign the final Kazan declaration. Given Saudi Arabia’s strategic ties with the U.S., its reluctance to fully embrace BRICS is quite understandable.

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva missed the summit, citing a head injury. Still, perhaps the most significant absence for Moscow was that of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, who has publicly expressed his friendship with Putin and Russia. Instead, Vučić met with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, attributing his absence from the Kazan summit to “circumstances.”

Despite these notable absences, the overall attendance of world leaders in Kazan made up for the missing figures, including Vučić and Lula da Silva, as well as the hesitance of Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia regarding BRICS membership. Joint photographs featuring Putin, with high-ranking attendees, including UN Secretary-General António Guterres, in three rows, highlighted that Russia’s actions in Ukraine have not deterred engagement with its leader..

The dreamers’ club

Opposing the West certainly isn’t the only theme that defines BRICS. Economic cooperation was originally the foundation upon which this alliance was built. British economist Jim O’Neill coined the term “BRIC” in 2001 to identify four rapidly expanding economies: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. He predicted that these nations could emerge as the world’s dominant economies by 2050, which has proven to be a bold assertion in light of subsequent developments.

Take Brazil, for example. Despite its struggle with political instability, Brazil’s economy continues to grow and ranks as the seventh largest globally. The country is gradually returning to democratic norms under the leadership of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a sign of its resilience and potential for growth.

Once able to leverage its G8 membership to act as a bridge between BRICS and the West, Russia has lost that advantage. Now, it faces intense sanctions, surpassing even Iran—the previous leader in sanctions—following its recent troubles. Coupled with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, this has rendered Russia the most economically vulnerable member of the group.

India, celebrated as the world’s largest democracy, has drifted toward authoritarianism under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has held power for over ten years. Meanwhile, China’s economic growth has hit a plateau. Although still an authoritarian state, China is shifting toward a more personalized regime.

Newly added BRICS members and partners do not stand out as economic powerhouses, either. The criteria for selecting new members seem to hinge more on their alliances with Russia and China, who see themselves as the bloc’s leaders rather than the candidates’ economic potential. For instance, why are Egypt and Ethiopia viewed as more significant than Nigeria? And why was Argentina invited to join but not Mexico? This somewhat arbitrary selection process significantly limits the pool of potential new members.

These dynamics also affect the perception of valuable initiatives from past BRICS summits, such as agricultural development and food security (2017, China), healthcare cooperation (2018, South Africa), and environmental sustainability addressing climate change (2020, Russia).

Meanwhile, many of the BRICS agenda items seem a bit far-fetched and poorly grounded. For example, last year in Johannesburg, the group focused on de-dollarizing the global economy and creating a unified BRICS currency. However, it’s worth noting that BRICS members—some of whom are under sanctions, like Russia and Iran—mostly carry out trade in U.S. dollars, the most stable currency globally. Discussions about moving away from it can sound somewhat populist and unrealistic.

The centerpiece of the BRICS summit in Kazan was the proposal for an alternative payment system, BRICS Bridge, aimed at replacing SWIFT, the established global interbank transfer mechanism. However, the lack of enthusiasm from members suggests that this concept doesn’t appeal much. Ironically, before the summit, attendees were cautioned to prepare for non-functional bank cards in Russia and advised to bring cash in dollars and euros.

Photo: Madina Nurman

Costs of participation

Populist initiatives are not a novelty in Central Asia. However, the prospect of joining BRICS and taking a stand against the West is unlikely to resonate strongly with any of the five republics, particularly as Europe and the United States have intensified their focus on the region in light of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

“Central Asian countries recognize that they are not the primary players but merely invited participants. Their involvement adds some significance to the event but not much beyond that. Since Russia is promoting BRICS with an anti-Western stance, the region sees little reason to engage in global conflicts,” explained Temur Umarov, a research fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin, during an interview with POLITIK Central Asia.

At the same time, Umarov remarked that Central Asian leaders could not outright reject the invitation to the summit. “Choosing not to attend would be seen as snubbing Putin, who extended the invitation. Additionally, they have previously participated in more politically charged events at his behest, such as the Victory Day Parade on May 9,” he added.

According to Umarov, it’s improbable that Central Asian nations will alter their position and pursue BRICS membership anytime soon. “Joining BRICS would mean Russia would begin to advocate for them against the West. This is already evident within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), even though its members assert that the organization is not aimed at countering anyone,” he said, stressing that “they can still engage with BRICS+ without formally becoming members of the bloc.”

Meanwhile, Kazakh political scientist Dimash Alzhanov remarked to POLITIK Central Asia that President Tokayev’s public decision to avoid joining BRICS was also directed at a domestic audience. He noted that authorities aimed to demonstrate that they are distancing themselves from Russia and its anti-Western agenda.

“If Kazakhstan were to align itself with this rhetoric, it wouldn’t gain any advantages and would likely foster a negative image. Additionally, there is a perception in the West that Kazakhstan is aiding Russia in evading sanctions. Joining BRICS would only heighten such suspicions, which Kazakhstan wants to avoid. I doubt that Kazakhstan’s refusal to join BRICS has caused significant discontent in Moscow, considering the two countries maintain close cooperation. Kazakhstan’s strategy is focused on preserving foreign policy flexibility,” Alzhanov noted.

He also pointed out that declining BRICS membership does not mean Central Asian countries are turning away from Russia or China. “Geographically, they are situated near both countries. Thus, irrespective of their membership in BRICS, they will continue to look toward their neighbors. Even if significant changes occur in the post-Soviet region, these nations will likely seek to maintain their ties and lean towards more conservative choices,” Alzhanov concluded.