For years, Central Asian countries were not known for their friendly relations with one another. However, recent years have seen these nations strengthening ties and discussing regional integration. A key item on the agenda is how to expand economic cooperation and improve the region’s image globally. Discussions have even extended to creating an “indivisible security space” and cooperating in the defense sector, a concept unimaginable a mere decade ago.

The growing interest in regional integration can be partly explained by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting need to collectively confront global threats. However, the story doesn’t end there, as efforts toward cooperation began before recent global upheavals. The key turning point was the change in political elites in most Central Asian countries.

Fault lines

In August 2024, during a meeting of Central Asian heads of state in Astana, the ambitious “Central Asia-2040” concept was adopted. It outlines plans for expanding economic and political cooperation, creating a positive image for the region, and strengthening its influence on the world stage. At first glance, the document appears to be a standard diplomatic declaration. However, not long ago, even discussing integration seemed unthinkable. The region was marked by numerous grievances and seemingly insurmountable problems between countries, leaving no room for regional cooperation. Politicians, journalists, and scholars advocating for integration often seemed short-sighted and naive.

This reluctance toward regional integration stemmed from the abundance of problems that arose in interstate relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union. While not all of these problems were intractable, their resolution became increasingly complex over time. Political inertia and accumulated mutual grievances only worsened the situation.

When these countries declared independence in 1991, they initially hoped to find common ground. They even announced that the region would now be called Central Asia, in contrast to the Soviet term “Middle Asia,” which typically referred to four countries—Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan—excluding Kazakhstan. 

This new name emphasized that the newly independent states saw themselves as a unified whole, sharing a common agricultural economy, similar histories, cultures, and identities. Moreover, power in most countries passed to former first secretaries of the Soviet republics, giving the impression that regional issues would be quickly resolved.

The most pressing issue was the allocation of water resources. Due to the predominantly agrarian economies, the problem of water scarcity, which was unevenly distributed across the region, came to the forefront. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, located in mountainous areas where rivers originate, had more control over water volumes. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, situated downstream, depended on the distribution of water by their neighbors. Water releases also affected the operation of hydropower plants, further exacerbating energy shortages.

Territorial disputes were another source of conflict. Borders between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan remain unresolved to this day, leading to occasional armed clashes. Nationalistic rhetoric from governments often worsens the situation, as conflicts are used to serve domestic political purposes.

Another obstacle to regional integration was the countries’ focus on consolidating their sovereignty, transitioning from planned economies to market systems, and building national identities during the early years of independence. The idea of integration, which implied transferring powers to a supranational level, was viewed with suspicion and associated with the Soviet past when key decisions were made in Moscow, not locally.

Additionally, the problems were more complex than initially thought, and as time passed, compromises became increasingly rare. Differences in development models also emerged: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan chose liberal and democratic reforms (albeit focusing initially more on economic than political aspects), while Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan took an authoritarian path with closed economies.

The main barrier to Central Asian integration was Uzbekistan under its first president, Islam Karimov. His protectionist policies led to the country’s withdrawal from the region’s unified energy system and the unannounced reduction or cessation of energy supplies to neighbors. Mines were installed in some disputed border areas, and transport links with Tajikistan were severed, with a visa regime introduced. In the final years of his rule, relations with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were nearly frozen, while those with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan remained tense. Regional rapprochement seemed out of the question.

However, attributing the failure of integration solely to Karimov’s Uzbekistan would be oversimplifying. Turkmenistan was even more isolated, with its government following a policy of “neutrality” and avoiding most regional issues. 

Kazakhstan, meanwhile, preferred to position itself not as part of Central Asia (guess the legacy of “Central Asia” took its toll), but as a country actively engaging with Russia, Asia, and the West. Instead of promoting strictly regional projects, its leadership emphasized initiatives in which Astana played the role of a key Eurasian power. In 1994, President Nursultan Nazarbayev proposed the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which was eventually implemented, although Russia took the leading role in this process.

Kazakhstan traditionally supports integration projects with Moscow, China, and Turkey more than with its Central Asian neighbors. It participates in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), and the Organization of Turkic States, which includes Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan but not Tajikistan. Turkmenistan is an observer in these organizations. Different approaches to participation in these organizations create additional divisions within Central Asia.

Generation switch

It is only fair to acknowledge that ideas for closer Central Asian cooperation did arise from time to time. There were occasions when the region genuinely acted as a united front. For instance, in 2006, the five countries came together to establish a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. Although the region faced no immediate threat of nuclear technology proliferation, the international community supported this initiative. It elevated the status and credibility of regional leadership, particularly since the idea was promoted by the entire region rather than a single country.

Another significant integration effort was the Central Asian Economic Union (CAEU), founded in 1994. Initially created to promote trade and economic cooperation, its annual meetings also addressed security, energy, and water resource management. In 2002, CAEU was transformed into the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), envisioned as a basis for regional integration.

While CACO did not achieve breakthroughs in any particular area, it was far from useless. The organization provided a platform for leaders to meet and discuss problems directly, helping to ease tensions. However, in 2005, after Russia joined the organization, it was decided to merge CACO with the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), which later became the EAEU. The rationale was that CACO duplicated the functions of other organizations, such as EurAsEC, SCO, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

One could argue that the longer the countries operated independently, the further they drifted apart. They developed distinct demographic compositions, population densities, economic and political models, GDP growth rates, and many other aspects. The lack of dialogue and disinterest in communication led to a situation where the countries practically ceased to understand each other.

It wasn’t until the late 2010s that serious discussions on regional integration in Central Asia resurfaced, coinciding with changes in political elites across the region. A pivotal moment was the death of Uzbekistan’s first President, Islam Karimov, in 2016, which led to a shift in power. Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who took over, began fostering more friendly relations with neighboring countries, giving new impetus to regional cooperation.

In 2019, Kazakhstan also experienced a transition of power when Nursultan Nazarbayev, who had seemed an unchangeable leader, passed his powers to a carefully chosen successor, career diplomat Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.

Turkmenistan’s recent involvement in regional affairs also stems from a change in leadership. In 2022, President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov transferred his powers to his son Serdar, and the country began to open up to the world. New threats also emerged that could not be ignored, such as the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan and their announcement of the Kosht-Tepe Canal construction, which threatened drought in Turkmenistan and neighboring countries. This issue sparked discussions at the regional level, with leaders from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan meeting in Ashgabat in 2023 to seek solutions.

Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon, the only remaining leader from the early 1990s, nonetheless supports regional cooperation. It is plausible that the anticipated power transition in the country will give new momentum for Tajikistan’s more active involvement in regional cooperation.

From common market to military alliance

The discussion on regional integration resumed on a regular basis in 2018, when the first summit of Central Asian heads of state was held. This year marked the sixth annual meeting, but the leaders of the region now meet far more frequently. The trend towards integration has received support from external partners, many of whom now interact with Central Asian leaders not just one-on-one but also in the “C5+1” format. In recent years, such meetings have been held with the United States, China, Russia, the EU, Germany, the OSCE, India, and Japan. A united region gives foreign countries confidence that their investments will pay off and that their projects will not be halted due to the specificities or whims of individual leaders.

Private meetings and summits go beyond mere discussions and yield tangible results. In recent years, mutual trade among Central Asian countries has grown sharply. In 2022, it reached a record $20 billion, and just a year later, it increased to $42 billion.

In 2023, the countries signed a memorandum of cooperation in transport logistics. The document outlines the creation of a network of transport corridors and logistics centers in Central Asia. These include the Trans-Caspian route, which connects the region with Europe via the Caspian Sea, and the Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran route, providing access to the Persian Gulf. These projects are expected to help Central Asia expand its trade links and overcome geographical isolation.

Social connections are also strengthening. People in Central Asian countries are traveling to each other’s nations more frequently, boosting ties between states. Tourism is on the rise as well: in the first nine months of 2023, Uzbekistan welcomed more than 3 million visitors from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. This growing movement of people promotes the development of logistics and reinforces regional connections.

Furthermore, many students are choosing to study not abroad but in neighboring countries within the region, such as Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. Medical services are also in high demand. In 2024, over 67,000 people from Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan traveled to Uzbekistan for treatment.

It is worth noting that Uzbek-Kazakh relations are the main driving force behind Central Asian integration. Most of the economic activity is concentrated between these two countries. Investments from Uzbekistan into Kazakhstan have been steadily increasing: from $186.4 million in 2018 to $400 million in 2023. Kazakhstan, in turn, actively invests in Uzbekistan, with its investments totaling $600 million last year.

Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, security issues have taken center stage in regional cooperation. The countries are striving to coordinate their actions in the field of defense. In addition to the Russian threat, risks related to Afghanistan persist. Despite many regional countries establishing contacts with the Taliban, the threats of terrorism, radical Islamism, and drug trafficking from Afghanistan remain significant.

At the recent Central Asian summit, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed creating an “indivisible security space” and discussing defense cooperation. While the unification of military-industrial complexes is still a distant goal, the very fact that such sensitive issues are being discussed is significant.

On one hand, the rapid establishment of cooperation among Central Asian countries might seem incredible. On the other hand, it is a natural development. The fragmentation of a region that evolved as a unified whole for centuries appears to be the real anomaly. However, the processes of integration will be sustainable not because it is fashionable or because others are doing it, but because Central Asia truly needs it. Integration must be primarily economically beneficial. If all the countries in the region recognize this and continue moving in that direction, the future will naturally embed integration into its historical context.