Iran sets its sights on Central Asia. There is interest, but circumstances get in the way

Central Asia, unlike the Middle East, Russia, or China, has not traditionally been a priority in Iran’s foreign policy. However, Tehran’s interest in this region has become more pronounced recently. Firstly, the Islamic Republic is engaged in several key projects with Central Asian countries, particularly logistics and gas exports. Secondly, this region serves as a crucial link in the chain of seamless communication between Iran, the Russian Federation, and China. While Iran often views the Middle East through an ideological lens, it tends to adopt a more pragmatic approach toward its relations with Central Asian states. This rational stance opens the door for enhanced cooperation with secular nations like Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, as well as theocratic Afghanistan, which is now under Taliban rule.

Transit prospects

For several years now, Iranian media has been discussing the idea of the Islamic Republic leveraging its geographic position to turn transit into a ‘new oil. Central Asia is pivotal in this vision, serving as a logical pathway for goods traveling from China and potentially functioning as an essential element of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. However, the development of transit routes isn’t confined to China alone. Following the onset of full-scale military operations in Ukraine in 2022, Russia has actively sought new logistics corridors, significantly enhancing the importance of its neighboring regions, including Central Asia.

In the context of Iran, Russia’s main initiative has become the North-South International Transport Corridor (ITC) project. Originally envisioned as a route linking the Persian Gulf to Northern Europe via Iran, the South Caucasus, and Russia, the corridor’s relevance as a gateway to Europe through Russia has diminished amid Western efforts to isolate Moscow. Instead, the North-South ITC has shifted to serve as a trade line between Iran and Russia, gaining renewed momentum for development.

One of the North-South ITC routes passes through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. To fully realize its potential, it is essential to modernize the existing infrastructure in the region, as it is currently considered a supplementary route. However, this transport artery offers several notable advantages. For instance, the railway connecting Russia and Iran through Central Asia has already been extended, and this connection is widely acknowledged in Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan.

Beyond the North-South International Transport Corridor (ITC), several initiatives are being explored for potential cooperation between Iran and Central Asian countries, except Afghanistan. Since the early 2010s, efforts have been in progress to develop a multimodal route that connects Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Oman. This route aims to link the Central Asian republics with the Persian Gulf states. Although the project was temporarily halted due to sanctions against Iran, it experienced a resurgence in 2022.

Another noteworthy initiative involves the establishment of a railway that connects Turkey, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, covering a distance of over 4,500 kilometers. The first train completed this route successfully in 2022.

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have also begun to seriously consider the opportunities tied to Iranian transit. In October 2022, Tajikistan proposed organizing road transport connecting China to Turkey via Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran. This resulted in the creation of a new multimodal corridor connecting Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to Iran and Turkey. Additionally, a railway route from Iran to Kyrgyzstan links the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas with the Kyrgyz city of Osh, and discussions are underway for a test launch of a container train between the two countries.

Despite the promising outlook for transit transportation, which could significantly boost trade and attract investment, its development faces considerable challenges. The primary issue lies in the extensive and sustained efforts needed to build and establish transport communications, requiring substantial infrastructure investments and the construction of new roads and railways. Moreover, nations developing new routes must persuade international logistics operators to adapt traditional supply chains and reconfigure transport flows. In other words, this is a complex task in which infrastructure issues are intertwined with security issues. And let’s not forget about the sanctions that limit the ability of other states to interact with Iran.

Security threats

In recent decades, Iran’s primary concern in Central Asia has been the security situation in Afghanistan. During the years of the American military presence, the Islamic Republic was worried about the civil war and the proximity of U.S. forces to its borders, which, along with Israel, represent Tehran’s main rivals. After the Americans withdrew, Iran has actively participated in meetings with Russia, China, and Central Asian states to address issues in Afghanistan, including those within the Moscow format.

At the same time, Iran’s relations with the new Afghan authorities are not without problems. In particular, the unclear delineation of the border and disputes over the water resources of the Helmand River led to local armed clashes in 2021 and 2023. At the same time, in both cases, the conflicts were one day long and quickly extinguished. Their causes, perhaps, lay in the organizational difficulties that the Taliban encountered in the initial stages of establishing their power in Afghanistan. Notably, the skirmishes did not develop into long-term friction and did not prevent Iran from becoming one of the first countries to de facto recognize the Taliban’s authority. Thus, the Islamic Republic handed over the building of the Afghan embassy in Tehran to the new rulers of Kabul, and Iranian politicians even began to call Afghanistan part of a friendly “axis of resistance” that, together with Tehran, is fighting the “Israeli threat.”

At the same time, the situation in Afghanistan itself under the Taliban has rather stabilized – the capture of Kabul in 2021 effectively put an end to the long-standing civil war. In addition, the Taliban have launched an active fight against opium cultivation, the main trafficking route of which traditionally runs from Afghanistan through Iran and Turkey before reaching the rich European market, where it is sold as heroin after laboratory purification. There are at least 2 million opiate addicts in the Islamic Republic. So, with the Taliban coming to power, Tehran hopes for an improvement in this area for the first time.

In other words, the risks to Iran emanating from Afghanistan are becoming more moderate, although they have not disappeared completely. In January 2024, a double explosion occurred in Kerman, Iran, on the anniversary of General Qasem Soleimani’s funeral, resulting in approximately 100 deaths and around 300 injuries. This terrorist attack was the largest in the Islamic Republic since 1979. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by ‘Wilayat Khorasan’—the Afghan branch of the Islamic State (ISIS).

Finally, there remains the problem of Afghan migrants, of whom there are at least 3.5 million in Iran. These are mainly Afghans who came to the Islamic Republic illegally to work and are employed in low-skilled labor. In 2024, the country launched a campaign to identify and deport them. Moreover, the authorities began building a 74-kilometer wall on the border with Afghanistan to limit migration flows. Considering that the length of the Iranian-Afghan border exceeds 900 kilometers, such a measure is unlikely to improve the situation significantly.

Finally, there remains the issue of Afghan migrants, with over 3.5 million currently in Iran. Most of them are Afghans who entered the Islamic Republic illegally in search of work, often taking low-skilled jobs. In 2024, a campaign was launched in Iran to identify and deport them. Moreover, authorities began constructing a 74-kilometer wall along the Afghan border to curb migration flows. Given that the Iran-Afghanistan border stretches over 900 kilometers, it’s unlikely that this measure will significantly impact the situation.

Consequently, Tehran continues to view Afghanistan as a potential source of both migration and security threats while actively working to mitigate these challenges.

Trade exchange

Despite their geographical proximity, the countries of Central Asia are not among Iran’s most important trading partners. Notably, Afghanistan stands out among regional players with the largest trade volume with the Islamic Republic, amounting to $1.8 billion in 2023. In contrast, the combined trade volume with other Central Asian countries barely exceeds $1.6 billion.

Afghanistan’s economy heavily depends on imports from Iran, representing about 25% to 35% of the nation’s total imports. These imports mainly include petroleum products, natural gas, iron, steel, food items, polyethylene, fruits, vegetables, and cement.

Meanwhile, Iran’s trade with the next largest Central Asian partners — Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan — is approximately $500 million each. The structure of trade varies from country to country. Kazakhstan is an important supplier of agricultural products, especially grains, to Iran. Turkmenistan plays a notable role in gas supplies. At the same time, trade with Uzbekistan includes a broad range of goods, such as petrochemicals, agricultural products, and textiles.

Recently, Tehran has been working to increase its trade with Central Asia. For instance, in 2025, an agreement establishing a permanent Free Trade Zone with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is expected to be enacted, significantly reducing tariffs. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the EAEU from the region. Additionally, Iran aims to sign bilateral trade agreements, including a preferential trade agreement concluded with Uzbekistan in 2023.

Tehran is also focused on integration with major international organizations. In 2023, Iran became a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

However, trade remains weak in Iran’s cooperation with Central Asia. First, Western sanctions against Tehran hinder the potential for increasing regional trade. Second, most Central Asian countries do not share a border with Iran, making overland transit more difficult amid the complex situation in Afghanistan. Third, the exports from several Central Asian nations predominantly consist of oil and gas, which limits the possibility of trade, as Iran is already a major supplier of hydrocarbons.

Hydrocarbon opportunities

Nevertheless, hydrocarbons remain a central focus of Iran’s interest in Central Asia. Afghanistan is a key importer of Iranian gas and petrochemical products, particularly gasoline and diesel. As of early 2022, Tehran supplied roughly 70% of Kabul’s total fuel imports.

The Taliban, however, has taken steps to reduce Afghanistan’s energy dependence on Iran by increasing gasoline imports from Russia and Uzbekistan and by working to revive the country’s oil refining industry. One motivation for this shift is the relatively low quality of Iranian fuel. Still, petroleum products and gas constitute a significant portion of Iran-Afghanistan trade.

Additionally, Iran, along with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, supplies electricity to Afghanistan, with Iran accounting for around 15% of Afghanistan’s total electricity imports.

Hydrocarbon cooperation is also expanding with Turkmenistan. While Iran has significant natural gas reserves, it faces challenges supplying “blue fuel” to its northeastern regions during peak winter consumption. To address this issue, a gas swap agreement has been established among Ashgabat, Tehran, and Baku. Initially, the parties agreed to export approximately 2 billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas annually. However, they later decided to increase this to 10 billion cubic meters. Under this arrangement, Iran imports gas from Turkmenistan and exports an equivalent volume of its gas to Azerbaijan.

Plans are underway to expand these swap arrangements, inviting additional countries to participate. For example, there is a proposal to use Turkmen gas for swap exports to Iraq. Iran supplies around 10 billion cubic meters annually but faces shortfalls during peak periods. Russia has also shown interest in swapping supplies through Iran, hoping to use existing pipelines to send gas to the Islamic Republic via Turkmenistan and redirect equivalent volumes from Iran to Turkey, Iraq, Azerbaijan, or Afghanistan. Initial estimates suggest that Russia could export approximately 10 billion cubic meters of gas through this arrangement. However, it remains unclear to what extent Turkmenistan is willing to support this scenario; as a major gas producer, Turkmenistan may, even if indirectly, view Russia as a competitor.

In the long term, Tehran envisions utilizing gas supplies through Turkmenistan’s existing pipeline network to achieve its ambitious goal of becoming an international gas hub. However, to make this a reality, Iran needs to access Asian markets — such as China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. Without advancing its liquefied natural gas (LNG) technology, Iran currently faces challenges, and exporting gas via tankers through the Persian Gulf would not be feasible. In light of sanctions, this scenario appears challenging, requiring substantial investment and time to implement.

Iran’s path into the region

While Iran’s relations with Central Asia often go unnoticed on the global stage, overshadowed by its more prominent engagements in the Middle East, the surrounding media buzz can occasionally shift attention away from these crucial dynamics.

For example, the news in 2022 about Iran launching an attack on drone production in Tajikistan was especially noteworthy. This was particularly significant given the turbulent relationship between Tehran and Dushanbe throughout the 2010s when Tajikistan viewed Iran as a security threat and barred its entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). However, a diplomatic shift has occurred since the early 2020s, highlighted by Tajik President Emomali Rahmon’s visits to Iran during the tenure of former President Ibrahim Raisi and the newly elected Masoud Pezeshkian.

The news about drone production gained additional attention amid the growing ties between Moscow and Tehran, especially as Iranian UAVs have been deployed by Russian forces in Ukraine. Some speculated that Tajikistan might supply these attack drones to Russia. Yet, those advocating this narrative neglected to mention that Russia uses the Shahed 131 and Shahed 136 models, while Tajikistan only assembled the older Ababil-2. As a result, Tajikistan has been keen to separate itself from the situation, and it seems likely that Central Asian countries will remain cautious about military-technical cooperation with Tehran, aware of possible backlash from the West.

Moreover, Iran is eager to regain ground in trade after Western sanctions significantly hampered its growth. There has been notable progress in this area: Iran has joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and formed agreements with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). However, it may still be premature to expect Central Asian countries to emerge as Tehran’s primary trading partners in the near future.

Nikita Smagin

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