If you believe the news from Russia, you’d think that nearly all the country’s internal issues stem from migrants hailing from Central Asia. Authorities claim that expelling Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz will lead to reduced crime, diminished terrorism threats, job security for Russians, and revitalization of the nation’s gene pool. However, the truth is far more complex. This heightened fear of migrants undermines an already stagnant economy and pushes the state further into a demographic crisis. At the same time, if Russian leadership decides to re-welcome migrants from post-Soviet countries, their numbers are unlikely to return to the level before the pandemic and the war in Ukraine. Increasingly, people from Central Asia seek opportunities in Europe, the United States, China, South Korea, and the Middle East, inching closer to ending Russia’s historical hold on the region’s labor force.

Migrants as scapegoats

Central Asian labor migrants in Russia are blamed for everything from rising crime to falling school performance. But who is contributing the labor necessary for urban development and economic sustainability? With the ongoing war in Ukraine, the pressures on these migrants are growing, revealing deep-seated contradictions within the situation.

Alongside the war in Ukraine, Russia is ramping up its efforts against labor migrants from Central Asia. While President Vladimir Putin accuses Ukrainians of “Nazism” and “violating the rights of Russian speakers,” authorities point fingers at Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz working in Russian cities, blaming them for nearly all of the country’s internal issues. The Kremlin claims that Central Asians are responsible for rising crime rates, terrorism, connections to Ukrainian intelligence, increased unemployment among Russians, wage suppression, and even a drop in students’ academic performance, as they supposedly struggle to learn alongside the children of migrants. The underlying motives for this wave of xenophobia against migrants, much like the “special operation” in Ukraine, remain unclear.

Labor migrants from Central Asia work in sectors that are unattractive to Russians: snow removal, garbage collection, construction, food service, food delivery, taxi services, retail, agricultural work, and care for the severely ill. Employers are eager to hire them because they agree to hard labor for lower wages and often do not require formal employment. Much of the construction of high-rise buildings in Russia is made possible by the influx of Central Asian migrants; for example, in 2014, they were responsible for building most of the Olympic facilities in Sochi. Currently, against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, migrants are being drawn into industrial jobs, including in the military-industrial complex, and are also being forced to join the Russian army and participate in combat operations.

Additionally, migrants play a crucial role in alleviating Russia’s demographic challenges. With the country’s death rate nearly double that of the birth rate, the population of 147 million can only be sustained through incoming migration. In the past two years, around 3 million migrants have arrived annually. However, most of them are seasonal workers who do not settle permanently. In 2021, the net migration gain—the difference between arrivals and departures—was close to 500,000, but by 2022, it plummeted to just 62,000. This drop is mainly due to decreased income levels stemming from sanctions and the recruitment of migrants for the war in Ukraine. In 2024, the influx fell even further, totaling 34,000 people amid a nationwide campaign against Central Asian migrants and stricter migration laws.

Despite these trends, individuals from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and, to some extent, Kazakhstan are still drawn to Russia in search of better job opportunities, as prospects at home are often limited. Meanwhile, Russia faces a significant labor shortage, estimated at around 4.8 million workers needed to support economic growth. Paradoxically, while the Russian government takes a hardline approach, the number of job vacancies available to Central Asian migrants continues to rise.

Russia for Russians?  

Campaigns targeting migrants are a recurring theme in the Russian Federation, as the search for both external and internal enemies has long been a cornerstone of Russian policy. While the West has traditionally served as the external adversary, labor migrants have often been labeled as internal enemies. Over the years, Russian authorities have conducted raids on groups such as Georgians and Tajiks, often as a means to exert pressure on the political leaders of nations that oppose Kremlin demands.

Aleksey Mayshev / RIA Novosti

The portrayal of migrants as hindrances in the everyday lives of regular Russians gained significant traction during election campaigns. Politicians, whether aligned with or against the Putin regime, have pledged to rid the country of immigrants, blaming them for crime and accusing them of failing to integrate. For example, in 2005, Dmitry Rogozin’s Rodina party entered elections with the slogan “Let’s cleanse Russia of garbage,” a thinly veiled reference to migrants. Similarly, in 2013, Alexei Navalny, while campaigning for mayor of Moscow, promised to introduce visas for Central Asian and Caucasian countries to limit migration. Though he later changed his stance, these inflammatory remarks continue to echo in public memory, even after Navalny’s demise in a Russian prison.

There’s little rational logic behind the current anti-migrant campaign. Perhaps the Kremlin is using the image of Central Asian immigrants as a distraction from the ongoing war in Ukraine. By taking a hard line against migrants, the government aims to project an image of effectiveness in safeguarding Russian citizens. Sadly, the treatment of migrants has become increasingly severe, with many forced to crawl in single file, kneel, and endure insults and torture. This cruel reality has defined the experiences of those who come to work in Russia over the past two and a half years.

After a terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall concert hall, attributed to individuals from Tajikistan, the situation for migrants has sharply deteriorated. Law enforcement’s cruelty towards Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Kyrgyz has intensified, with these individuals subjected to hours of interrogation and deportation.

It appears that the activities of State Duma deputies, Ministry of Internal Affairs employees, and the Investigative Committee are primarily focused on targeting citizens from Central Asian republics. Russian officials are introducing new anti-migrant initiatives nearly every day. For example, former President Dmitry Medvedev is calling for a ban on migrants coming to Russia with their families. Meanwhile, the head of the Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastrykin, has reported on the “capture” of migrants and their deployment to the war in Ukraine.

Viktor Paukov, head of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Moscow Region, has stated the goal of “brightening” the region, implying it should not be “darkened” by foreign citizens. The Ministry of Education has even suggested that schools limit the number of foreigners in their classrooms, equating their presence to accommodating disabled children. Patriarch Kirill has also insisted on tightening migration policies, claiming that migrants pose a threat to Russia’s “cultural tradition.”

In response to the growing anti-migrant sentiment, several laws have been passed that further undermine the rights of migrants in Russia. The government plans to establish a register for visitors who breach the rules, enabling law enforcement to restrict migrants’ rights without due process, conduct home raids, check documents and financial accounts, and deport individuals from the country.

In essence, having failed to prevent a terrorist attack, authorities and security forces seem eager to demonstrate their effectiveness through misguided methods of total control. By stoking distrust towards migrants, the Russian leadership is mobilizing society in a conservative manner, which serves as a smokescreen for systemic inefficacies.

Quiet resistance

The anti-migrant campaign in Russia continues with nearly silent consent from Central Asian leaders, whose rare attempts to defend their citizens go unanswered by the Kremlin. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon’s call for Putin to target terrorists, not Tajiks, was ignored. Similarly, there was no response to Kyrgyz Prime Minister Akylbek Japarov’s request for respectful treatment of all EAEU citizens, including Kyrgyz nationals. Uzbek parliamentarians also tried to stand up for migrants. However, their actions were limited to disputing with Russian officials on social media.

Meanwhile, Central Asian leaders continue to meet with Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials at SCO, CIS, CSTO, and EAEU summits to discuss strategic partnerships and the strengthening of trade and political ties. The issue of migrant rights violations in Russia is either ignored or left unaddressed altogether. This seems strange, considering that remittances sent by migrants make up as much as half of Tajikistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s GDP and around 20% of Uzbekistan’s GDP. One might think that citizens whose contributions support their home economies deserve protection. However, regional authorities apparently understand the difficulty of providing enough jobs domestically. With Russia remaining the primary labor market, they seek to avoid conflicts with the Kremlin.

Mikhail Voskresenskiy / RIA Novosti

Moscow’s position also appears puzzling. In the context of Russia’s isolation, it would seem counterproductive to strain relations with Central Asia by fostering anti-migrant sentiments, primarily since these countries have maintained positive relations with Russia after the war in Ukraine began. Furthermore, they serve as key channels for “grey” imports into Russia. Yet, the Kremlin seems confident that its neighbors are too dependent on the Russian labor market to respond with any countermeasures.

Russia loses its monopoly on migrant workers

While the leaders of Central Asian countries rarely speak out in defense of migrants publicly, some steps have been taken within these countries to address the issue. Governments are increasingly focused on generating employment opportunities abroad for their citizens. To this end, special departments are being set up within foreign and labor ministries to engage with international partners and broaden job prospects for their nationals. Additionally, local officials assist those seeking work overseas, providing help with necessary paperwork, visa applications, and pre-departure training.

These initiatives are already yielding positive results. For example, Türkiye has emerged as the second most popular destination for labor migrants after Russia, with over 200,000 Central Asians currently working there. South Korea has also become a preferred destination, raising its quota for Uzbek migrants by 37,000 in 2024 and expressing readiness to employ up to 100,000 Uzbeks. Currently, more than 69,000 Uzbek citizens reside in South Korea, making them the fifth-largest diaspora in the country.

Japan has shown interest as well, albeit on a smaller scale. In 2023, it signed agreements on labor migration with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with several hundred individuals now undergoing pre-departure training.

The UAE has ramped up its acceptance from 15,000 to a staggering 1 million workers from Central Asia. Saudi Arabia is also making moves, offering 100,000 job opportunities. Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain are expanding their seasonal work quotas for regional workers. They are poised to increase further if reliability is proven.

Kazakhstan is attracting more migrants from neighboring countries as well. In 2024, over 10,500 Tajiks, around 30,000 Kyrgyz, and about 76,000 Uzbeks relocated to Kazakhstan, primarily working in construction, hospitality, retail, and small to medium-sized enterprises.

A notable trend is the increasing interest from Western countries in labor migrants from Central Asia. In 2022, as many as 6,000 individuals from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan found employment in the U.K. The need for migrants from this region has surged following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as the U.K. had formerly depended on seasonal workers from Ukraine.

Additionally, Brexit has introduced more bureaucracy for hiring E.U. citizens, whose wage expectations are generally higher than those of Asian migrants. As a result, in 2024, the U.K. increased quotas for Uzbek migrants to 10,000, Kyrgyz migrants to 8,000, and Tajik migrants to 1,000 people.

Interest in Central Asian workers is rising in the E.U., especially in Eastern Europe, where many locals are relocating to wealthier Western European countries. For instance, 75% of businesses in Slovakia are experiencing labor shortages. In 2023, Volkswagen Slovakia hired over 1,500 Uzbek migrants, who earned between €1,200 and €1,600 a month—considerably more than they would typically make in Russia.

The demand for Central Asian labor migrants is increasing in Poland, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Bulgaria. Lithuania, in particular, has seen a dramatic spike: Uzbek arrivals jumped from 1,800 in 2023 to 9,700 in 2024, while Kyrgyz arrivals grew from 2,000 to 6,000. This surge has made Central Asian migrants the third-largest group in Lithuania, following Ukrainians and Belarusians, raising some concerns among local authorities. Darius Jauniškis, the head of the State Security Department, reported that due to the surge in arrivals from Central Asian countries, his department is struggling to check everyone promptly. However, he assured that there are currently no serious concerns to worry about.

In Bulgaria, Kyrgyz citizens have become the largest group of seasonal workers in 2023, with over 2,000 registered.

In 2022, around 5,000 labor migrants from Uzbekistan and more than 3,000 from Kazakhstan migrated to Poland. In response, the Polish government has proposed simplifying the work permit process for Uzbek migrants, with about 3,000 currently employed there.

Moreover, Central Asians are now one of the main groups of undocumented migrants in the United States. Between 2013 and 2022, around 70,000 people from the region made their way to the U.S., with 50,000 arriving in 2023 alone. The primary drivers for this trend include unstable incomes back home and a waning interest in Russia’s labor market. Many undocumented migrants from Central Asia hold Russian passports and seek asylum in the U.S. to evade military service in Russia’s war against Ukraine. This border cross surge has prompted Central and South American transit countries to tighten controls on arrivals from Russia and Central Asia. Despite the increasing number of migrants exploring new destinations, Russia remains the most accessible labor market for them. Europe, the U.S., and Asia struggle to fill that gap due to challenges related to documentation, visa requirements, and language barriers. A few years back, it was hard to envision hundreds of thousands of migrants looking beyond Russia. Now, this is a reality, and if the Kremlin maintains its current stance, Russia’s hold on Central Asian workers might well come to an end.