Multi-vector and strategic silence. How Central Asian countries choose their foreign partners

At the scene of the New Cold War between Russia, the West and China, the countries of Central Asia seem to be neutral territories. And although, the thesis of equidistance in foreign policy was voiced in this region back in the 90s, the full effects of this approach have only become evident recently. But how and by what means did five relatively different governments manage to form unified mechanisms of interaction with the outside world? 

Similar concepts

Immediately after the declaration of independence, the young republics of Central Asia had to analyze the key issue, which is a determination of foreign policy priorities. This task required imagining how external players see the region and finding a response to the question: what exactly should be the goal of international cooperation?

Gradually, five governments, all of which were formed from the same Soviet nomenclature, were able to determine quite logical criteria for choosing partners: “sovereignty” (that is, influence at the global level) and “material characteristics” – geographical location, volume of trade and investments. 

Determining the importance of foreign partners for Central Asian countries on the basis of their sovereignty is usually reflected in documents such as foreign policy concepts or presidential messages. Therefore, in the Concept of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy for 2020-2030, the priorities in the field of regional and multilateral diplomacy relevant to the topic of this article indicate the further development of “allied relations” with Russia, “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China, “expanded strategic partnership” with the United States of America, “expanded partnership and cooperation” with The European Union and its members, “continued close cooperation with the EAEU and its governments” and “development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation” with the CIS governments. Further in the concept, the regions and countries of the world are specified. 

A similar approach is used in the current Concept of Tajikistan’s Foreign Policy that was accepted in 2015. The CIS countries are considered as “traditional partners” with whom it is necessary to develop “long-term and stable relations”. Additionally, it is separately indicated that “expansion and strengthening of traditionally friendly relations and strategic partnership”  has  “particular importance” with Russia. Except the CIS countries, China, Afghanistan, Iran and the United States are separately mentioned as non-regional partners. And just like in the case of Kazakhstan, there is a fairly extensive list of countries that covers the whole world.

The Concept of Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Policy in 2019 does not focus on specific countries that could be considered as priorities, however, it is indicated that the foreign policy priority in the political sphere is “strengthening and deepening relations with allies and strategic partners”, “close cooperation within global, regional organizations and integration associations”, as well as “the development of a mutually beneficial cooperation with the countries of the near and far abroad in bilateral and multilateral formats.”

Analogical conceptual documents of Turkmenistan (the Concept of the Foreign Policy course of neutral Turkmenistan for 2022-2028) and Uzbekistan (the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan) have not been published. However, if we take a look at other types of documents, for example, the annual messages delivered by the President of Uzbekistan, we can notice the similarity of the approach to determination of foreign policy priorities with other Central Asian countries.

Thus, in the Message of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the Oliy Majlis in 2020, it is highlighted that Uzbekistan will “expand multifaceted and mutually beneficial relations with our main partner countries – Russia, China, the United States, Turkey, Germany, France, Great Britain, South Korea, Japan, India, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and other governments.” In his Message to the Oliy Majlis and the people of Uzbekistan in December 2022, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev dwells on foreign policy issues more precisely retaining key messages, noting that Uzbekistan will focus on strengthening multifaceted and mutually beneficial cooperation with all the governments, that are considered as its strategic partners.

As a result, within the framework of the first approach, we can say that, with one deviation or another, the Central Asian countries consider global sovereignties (Russia, the United States, China, the European Union countries) as the most important countries for themselves, followed by neighboring regional sovereignties (Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan, South Korea, Japan), or partner countries in international organizations such as the CIS and the SCO.

Positioning the importance of non-regional partners for Central Asian countries on the basis of “material” connections is not systematic and, as a rule, is fixed according to the situation, as happened during the visit of German Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz to Kazakhstan, when the President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, responded to the request of “speaking out about the regulation of the situation in Ukraine,” with “Kazakhstan has the longest delimited land border in the world with Russia, cooperation between our countries is developing within the framework of strategic partnership and alliance.”

In compliance with the data on foreign trade of the Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan, in 2023, the main partner countries of Kazakhstan in exports were Italy (18.9%), China (18.7%), Russia (12.4%), the Netherlands (5.2%), Turkey (5%), the Republic of Korea (4.8%), and in imports – China (27.4%), Russia (26.5%), Germany (5.2%), USA (4.2%), Republic of Korea (3.6%), Turkey (3.3%).

According to the National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyzstan, the country’s main non–regional export partners in 2023 were Switzerland (32.2%), Russia (24.3%), China (5.8%), the United Arab Emirates (5.6%), Turkey (4.5%), the United States (2.8%); in imports – China (42.8%), Russia (18.2%), Republic of Korea (4.4%), Turkey (3.6%), Germany (3.4%), USA (3.4%).

Uzbekistan’s main partners outside of Central Asia, according to the Statistics Agency under the President of Uzbekistan, in exports in 2023 were Russia (14.6%), China (10%), Turkey (5.1%) and Afghanistan (3.5%), in imports – China (29.3%), Russia (17.2%), Republic of Korea (6%), Turkey (4.9%) and Germany (2.5%).

The Agency for Statistics under the control of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan provides data on foreign trade. In accordance with the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Tajikistan, in 2021, the country’s main non-regional trading partners were Russia (21.3% of trade turnover), Switzerland (14.4%), China (13.1%) and Turkey (6.1%). 

Seeing countries such as Switzerland in these lists is explained by the fact that their trade and economic relations with Central Asia are mainly due to their interest in resources. Therefore, the main component of trade turnover (93.7%) between Tajikistan and Switzerland is the trade in valuable or semi-valuable stones, expensive metals and so on. A similar outcome will be seen if we analyze the data not on trade turnover, but on investment volumes.

Thus, when considering the materialistic factors in determining the foreign policy priority of certain countries, geographical proximity and correlated economic connectivity, as well as the focus of foreign partners on the resources that the countries of the region can provide, are considered as a key importance for Central Asia.

Visits and summits

The method of cooperation between Central Asian countries and foreign policy partners is reflected in diplomatic activity, as well as the exchange of visits by leaders of interested governments. In recent years, the “C5+1” format has become popular, within the framework of which the leaders of the Central Asian countries meet with the head of an interested government.

For the first time, this variation of a dialogue was implemented by Japan in 2004 at the level of foreign affairs ministers. Later, it was used by South Korea. In the 2010s, the C5+1 format at the level of foreign affair ministers began to be actively used by the United States, which was mainly reflected in consultations with US Secretary of State John Kerry in Samarkand.

The intensification of work in the “C5+1” format has been happening in the last two years. The participants of the meetings were Russia, China and Germany. Furthermore, The Central Asia + USA summit was held in New York for the first time. In addition to the governments, the parties of the dialogue were the European Union and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Persian Gulf. Although the C5+1 format is criticized for not making any significant decisions within its framework, unlike bilateral meetings, in Central Asia it is considered as one of the tools for regionalization of this space. In other words, all five republics want the outside world to see them as an integrated space.

Very interesting information about the foreign policy priorities of the Central Asian countries is provided by the Index of Potential for Bilateral Foreign Influence (Foreign Bilateral Influence Capacity), calculated by the Atlantic Council and the Center for the International Future Frederica Purdy at the School of International Studies named after Josef Korbel at the University of Denver. This index takes into account indicators such as trade in goods, foreign aid, weapon trade, diplomatic exchanges, joint membership in intergovernmental organizations, trade agreements and military alliances. In this case, the index data combine both of the previously considered country positioning lines. If we focus only on non-regional countries with which Central Asia has the closest bilateral cooperation recorded in this index, and do not take into account the strength of this cooperation, then a fairly large number of common points can be observed. (Table 1).

Table 1. The main non-regional partners of the Central Asian countries in terms of bilateral influence according to the Index of potential of bilateral foreign influence (2020)

The top ten non–regional forces in almost all Central Asian countries include Russia and Belarus, as well as Lithuania (with the exception of Turkmenistan, where Russia is in 11th position, Belarus is in 15th, and Lithuania is in 30th), Ukraine, Afghanistan (with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, where Afghanistan occupies 22nd position), Georgia (the exception is Tajikistan, where Georgia is in the 14th position), China and Turkey (the exception is Kazakhstan, where China is in the 12th position, and Turkey is in the 16th).

What is being “multi-vector”? 

In general, both in terms of positioning foreign policy priorities in government documents and in terms of their material basis, it can be said that a rigid priority model is not typical for Central Asian countries. Such a situation in the region is commonly referred to as “multi-vector”. A clear indication of such grounds for conducting a multi-vector policy was given by the President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in November 2022, noting that “considering the geopolitical position, taking into account the fact that more than 500 billion dollars are involved in our economy, as well as the fact that global companies operate in our market, we simply have to pursue a multi-vector … foreign policy.“

 It is believed that Kazakhstan is most actively and consistently pursuing this policy, where the term “multi-vector” was entered into official documents back in the late 1990s. The mentioned policy was considered as a tool to “strengthen sovereignty and territorial integrity, maintain stability in the Central Asian region and expand the peaceful relations around Kazakhstan.” In the Foreign Policy Concept signed by President Tokayev in 2020, the commitment to the principle of “multi-vector” is confirmed. Additionally, it is highlighted that the policy of multi-vector means “the development of friendly, equal and mutually beneficial relations with all governments, interstate associations and international organizations of practical interest to Kazakhstan.“

Kyrgyzstan also characterizes its foreign policy as a multi-vector one, and that policy states that “the Kyrgyz Republic pursues a pragmatic, balanced, open, multi-vector and consistent foreign policy.” At the same time, multi–vector is associated with openness and is referred as “the development of cooperation with all United Nations members and international organizations on the basis of neighborliness, mutual understanding and respect for interests.“

Tajikistan regards the multi-vector side of its foreign policy as an instrument for “protecting the strategic interests of the country” and as “serving for the purpose of maintaining friendly and mutually advantageous ties with various countries of the world and basing it on unconditional respect for international law” (the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Republic of Tajikistan).

Turkmenistan’s foreign policy, which is based on the principle of “permanent neutrality”, can also be considered as a multi-vector one if we approach it from a certain aspect.

Uzbek experts, as a rule, are critical when it comes to attempting to describe Uzbekistan’s foreign policy as multi-vector, especially if it is done by analogy with Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. Uzbek researcher Rustam Makhmudov believes that multi–vector is the foreign policy strategy of the “second row countries“, which involves balancing between different centers of power and playing on the contradictions and confrontation of these centers. In his opinion, other concepts such as “multidimensional” are more suitable to describe Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, as a distinctive feature of which is indicated “taking measures to reduce the possibilities of competition escalating into a fierce clash of interests”, and an example of its practical implementation is considered Uzbekistan’s refusal to participate in any military-political bloc while maintaining the possibility of building allied relations outside the military-political sector of international relations. The justification for the legality of using the term “multidimensional” is also the fact that the concept of “multi-vector” is not used in official documents in Uzbekistan. While multidimensional is one of the key concepts.

Sometimes the Uzbek method of multi-vector is denoted as equidistance from the centers of power. This position is supported, in particular, by Bakhtiyor Ergashev, director of the Ma’no Center for Research Initiatives. According to Nurbek Bekmurzayev, the concept of “equidistance”, in contrast to Kazakhstan’s “multi-vector nature”, which emphasizes deepening cooperation and multilateral integration, focuses on Uzbekistan’s desire to distance itself from the centers of power to the point from where it can get the maximum benefit using the opportunities provided by competition between world sovereignties.

Silence is gold 

During the current international crisis, multi-vector can be seen as “strategic silence” (the term is proposed by Timur Dadabaev and Shigeto Sonoda): The position of the Central Asian countries is structured in such a way “to avoid openly taking sides, not because the Central Asian governments do not have a clear position, but because such strategic silence reflects the reality that the Central Asian governments are interested in relations with both Russia and the West. Therefore, any position expressed by them will have a negative impact on their post-war relations with these countries.”

Consequently, the positioning of foreign policy players in the Central Asian countries is determined by several factors, including similar ideological attitudes (highlighting global and regional powers among governments and emphasizing the importance of friendly relations with them) highlighted in official narratives, and the materiality of the Central Asian countries – their geographical location, the presence or absence of specific resources (including transit ones), as well as the established structure of foreign trade and investment. The summary of these factors determines that all Central Asian countries pursue a multi-vector policy or a policy of neutrality, which does not imply special proximity to one or another center of power.

If we think about the basis of this approach, it becomes clear why the Central Asian countries have chosen exactly this method of behavior in relation to such important world events as the war in Ukraine, the new crisis in the Middle East or the growing confrontation between the United States and China. If official documents and statements from the Central Asian countries seem to an outside observer as if they are avoiding a direct answer to pressing questions, it does not mean they have secret intentions. The goal of the Central Asian countries position for three decades has been avoiding any response to questions in a situation where the question itself is considered incorrect and any response to it can only worsen the situation of the country.

Rustam Burnashev

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