Not just holding on, but profiting

How three years of the Russia-Ukraine war have shaped Central Asia’s politics and economy

Three years ago, Russian troops commenced a significant military operation deep within Ukrainian territory, targeting Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernigov, and Sumy from the northwest, and Kherson, Nikolaev, and Zaporizhia from the south. The local conflict in Donbas, which had persisted since 2014, escalated into a full-scale war. The impact of this situation extended beyond Ukraine, influencing Central Asia, where strong historical ties to both Russia and Ukraine prevail. In light of these developments, POLITIK Central Asia has undertaken a detailed analysis of how 2022 transformed the region and the progress achieved since then.

Kazakhstan: the ‘yurty nezlamnosti’ (fortress of resilience) and the parade on Red Square

At the beginning of 2022, Kazakhstan faced significant upheaval. The protests in January, which were influenced by conflicts among elite groups, turned Almaty—Kazakhstan’s largest and most vibrant city—into a battlefield for several days. In response to the unrest, an unprecedented decision was made: members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which includes Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Belarus, and Armenia, along with Kazakhstan, launched a large-scale military operation aimed at restoring order.

Russia played a prominent role, dispatching the 31st Air Assault Brigade from Ulyanovsk. By January 2022, these troops had landed in Almaty, taking control of the city’s airport. Just a month later, in February 2022, they attempted a similar operation at Hostomel Airport near Kyiv.

However, while the operation in Almaty went mostly smoothly, the engagement at Hostomel would become one of the most intense confrontations of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Although Russian troops ultimately secured the airport, they were unable to use it effectively to deploy heavy equipment and advance towards Kyiv.

As Russian troops attacked Kyiv, Kazakhstan’s leadership in Astana urgently needed to rethink their strategy—carefully balancing every word and action to uphold their longstanding principle of “multi-vector diplomacy.” In the end, Kazakhstan’s authorities expressed support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity but stopped short of openly condemning Russia’s “special military operation.” They allowed a single anti-war protest, but after demonstrators directed insults at Vladimir Putin, further protests were swiftly curtailed.

Later, at the 2022 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev stated that Kazakhstan would never recognize the independence of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. However, this did not prevent Russian authorities from unilaterally annexing these territories, as well as the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions.

Simultaneously, Kazakhstan has kept its position as a “reliable ally of Russia.” President Tokayev often highlights this in his public speeches. In late 2024, Vladimir Putin visited Astana and received a warm welcome. Banners welcomed him with the message, “Your Excellency, Mr. Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, welcome to Astana!” While calling him “Your Excellency” was just a diplomatic gesture, it sparked lively discussions on social media.

President Tokayev has stated on two occasions that “Russia is militarily unbeatable” and has demonstrated strong backing for the developing discussions between Vladimir Putin and former U.S. President Donald Trump. It is known that Tokayev intends to visit Moscow on May 9 to participate in the festivities commemorating the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War—a holiday that Kazakhstan has also designated as one of its most important for 2025. However, this does not prevent the Kazakh government from actively seeking strategic partnerships with both neighboring countries and Western nations. An important example is their strengthening relationship with France, which is underscored by formal declarations of “friendship” and informal joint photo sessions.

In essence, Kazakhstan follows a multi-vector foreign policy, which guides its international relations. In May 2024, President Tokayev shared this strategy with a global audience in an op-ed for Euronews.

He stated, “We avoid the complications of superpower politics, which lets us adapt and work through complex diplomatic issues. Even though we are not superpowers, countries like ours have economic strength, military resources, and most importantly, the political commitment and diplomatic skills to play an important role on the global stage. This includes areas like food and energy security, the green transition, IT, and supply chain resilience.”

Questioning this approach is unwise. In the summer of 2024, State Counsellor Erlan Karin clarified Kazakhstan’s “red lines” for public discourse, one of which pertains to the country’s international relations.

Uzbekistan: understanding does not mean approval

Following the outbreak of the war, the Uzbek leadership chose to proceed with extreme caution. Both the president and officials refrained from discussing the situation in person to avoid stirring any emotions, opting instead for a series of meticulously crafted press releases.

The exception was Abdulaziz Kamilov, the then-head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During a parliamentary address in March 2022, he sought to clarify that Tashkent did not recognize the DPR and LPR as legitimate entities, even though Russia had already acknowledged their independence but had not yet annexed them.

This assertion quickly sparked rumors regarding his impending resignation, which were eventually confirmed a month later. By that time, Kamilov, aged 74, cited health reasons for his departure, though this was likely a significant factor alongside his age. After stepping down from his diplomatic role, he continued to serve in government and now holds the position of special representative for the President of Uzbekistan on foreign policy matters.

Tashkent’s careful approach to statements about the war came with its own challenges. When the Kremlin’s press service announced that in dialogue with Vladimir Putin, the Uzbek president had “spoken with understanding about the position and actions of the Russian side,” observers were left guessing about the true meaning behind this phrasing.

“Understanding does not equate to support,” an anonymous Uzbek diplomat shared with POLITIK Central Asia. “For the first six months, we were in a state of shock as all our logistics linked to Russia fell apart.”

Another colleague added, “We maintain a neutral stance, but it’s not absolute. If faced with a choice between Russia and Ukraine, we stay neutral. However, when it comes to choosing between war and peace, we unequivocally stand for peace.”

Kyrgyzstan: not big enough to play geopolitics

Kyrgyzstan, often regarded as the most unstable country in Central Asia, entered 2022 amidst a significant transitional phase. After a power shift in 2020, Sadyr Japarov took on the role of acting president in November and was officially elected in January of the following year. His main priority was domestic issues, ensuring that his position was secure against any potential revolutionary unrest.

The country also faced a border conflict with Tajikistan. In both 2021 and 2022, serious clashes occurred along the border, marked by the use of drones and tanks.

Amid these tensions, while the Russian army advanced toward Kyiv, the Kyrgyz president chose to adopt a stance of benevolent neutrality, albeit with a clear inclination toward Moscow, acknowledging the critical need to maintain strong ties with Russia.

A government source in Kyrgyzstan shared with POLITIK, “We’re quite different from Kazakhstan. Their population tends to be more neutral, with some openly supporting Ukraine. In contrast, our people are decidedly pro-Putin. The president understands that we’re not in a position to play a significant role in international politics right now. Our focus is solely on our own development, and we want to avoid distractions. We need a strong, prosperous Russia that isn’t burdened by past grievances. When Russia is upset, it often retaliates, such as targeting migrants, whose numbers are decreasing due to these tensions. An isolated partner tends to drag down everyone who relies on it.”

Echoing sentiments from Astana, the source added that Bishkek is hopeful for a resolution to the conflict, ideally through the efforts of the new U.S. President, Donald Trump. “We’re keeping our fingers crossed—hoping for this war to end as soon as possible. It’s really not in our best interest,” he stated.

Turkmenistan and Tajikistan: neither war no ‘special operation’

The two remaining nations in the area share many similarities and can be examined together, as there is very little to discuss regarding them. Since 2022, they have predominantly remained quiet, avoiding even neutral remarks or urgent calls for a diplomatic resolution. At times, this silence has approached the ludicrous. A striking example is when the publication “Neutral Turkmenistan” featured an interview with the Ukrainian ambassador in Ashgabat, entirely neglecting any reference to the war. In 2020, these nations similarly ignored the coronavirus, propagating claims of no infections and no necessity for quarantine protocols.

Ashgabat and Dushanbe are also connected by the political changes both nations underwent in 2022. In Turkmenistan, early elections occurred on March 12, 2022, leading to Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov transferring power to his son, Serdar. Conversely, Tajikistan’s political transition remains unresolved but is anticipated to resume eventually. Due to the delicate nature of these domestic developments and the wariness of local elites, any reaction to the distant conflict was practically unattainable.

While Turkmenistan, with its stringent isolation and closed borders, has successfully detached itself from these distressing events, Tajikistan faced a grim situation when its citizens were implicated in a terrorist incident at Crocus City Hall. This event led Russian security agencies to actively suggest the presence of a “Ukrainian trace.” The trial of the apprehended militants is still ongoing, and its outcome will likely depend on the political environment, particularly concerning who is ultimately perceived as the orchestrator of the attack.

From crisis to opportunity

Russia’s ongoing war with Ukraine has led to Moscow facing significant isolation from Western markets, creating a unique moment of opportunity for Central Asia.

For the first time in the lengthy history of post-Soviet relations, Russia has found itself in a position where it needs Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan as much as, if not more than, they need it.

However, this apparent shift shouldn’t limit our understanding of how regional leaders respond to the situation. Importantly, one of the five republics, Turkmenistan, has successfully boosted its trade with Moscow—primarily by evading sanctions—and with Ukraine. This development is noteworthy given Turkmenistan’s historically tenuous ties with the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, Uzbekistan is keeping pace, with its trade volume with Kyiv remaining stable and showing positive trends. In fact, in 2023, Ukraine unexpectedly became the largest apple supplier to Uzbekistan. Such outcomes are no coincidence; they stem from coordinated efforts between Ashgabat, Tashkent, and Kyiv to boost trade amid unavoidable challenges.

For instance, back in 2019, Taras Kachka, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Economic Development, Trade, and Agriculture, visited Tashkent. By 2020, Uzbekistan’s Minister of Investments and Foreign Trade, Sardor Umurzakov, and Ukrainian Ambassador Nikolai Doroshenko aimed to elevate trade between their nations to $1 billion. This goal might have been achieved if not for the war; in 2021, trade volume reached a record $737 million, positioning Ukraine as Tashkent’s eighth-largest economic partner. Moreover, the Turkmen ambassador in Kyiv held discussions with officials—including Deputy Foreign Minister Emine Dzhaparova—focused on strengthening bilateral cooperation.

The close ties between Ukraine, which has embraced a pro-Western and democratic path, and the secretive autocracy of Turkmenistan may seem unexpected at first glance. However, this relationship is rooted in a shared history.

Few people recall that until 2006, Turkmenistan was Ukraine’s sole natural gas supplier. Today, restoring that framework of cooperation in the gas sector is virtually impossible, as the primary transit route for Turkmen gas to Ukraine has now been compromised by Russian aggression. The CAC (Central Asia-Center) gas pipeline, with a capacity of 55 billion cubic meters per year, is mainly non-operational, as noted by Viktor Mayko, the Ukrainian Ambassador to Ashgabat, in a recent article.

Previously, Turkmen gas held great potential for Ukraine to decrease its dependence on Russia, its most formidable neighbor—an issue that POLITIK has covered extensively regarding Ashgabat’s international relations. Yet, it’s clear that due to restrictions on transit through Russian territory, all trade must now navigate through Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea. This route aligns with the Middle Corridor, which China and European nations are attempting to develop as an alternative to maritime transport and rail transit through Russia, though success has been limited thus far.

As Azerbaijani political analyst Shujat Ahmadzada explains to POLITIK, “A journey from China to Romania should take no more than 20 days. However, actual travel times can vary significantly, often stretching to 40-50 days. Consequently, the Middle Corridor lags behind traditional sea routes in global transportation, but it remains vital for linking the Caucasus with Central Asia.” Other potential routes, such as bypassing the Caspian Sea through Iran, pose even greater complications.

It’s worth noting that in October 2022, Tashkent reached an agreement with Turkmen authorities to utilize the Turkmenbashi port. By December, the first container train to Bulgaria had set off using this route.

The presence of Ukrainian goods on store shelves has also been noted by Kubatbek Rakhimov, the executive director of the public foundation “Applicata — Center for Strategic Solutions” based in Bishkek. He explains that “detergents and cosmetics in Kyrgyzstan come from various brands, entering the country through three main routes: directly from Western Europe, Russia, and Eastern Europe.” He points out that the labels reveal their origin with EAEU markings and Russian text or featuring Ukrainian, Georgian, or Azerbaijani. This indicates that distributors might use the Caspian route to navigate certain restrictions. Notably, Ukrainian confectionery products, like those from the Roshen factory and rolled metal, machine tools, industrial chemicals, and medicines, have made their way into the region. In particular, due to their cost-effectiveness, generic Ukrainian drugs have gained popularity in Central Asia.

Trade between Central Asia and Russia has had its share of ups and downs over the past three years of conflict. Logistical issues and the inability to adapt quickly have been significant challenges.

An anonymous Uzbek diplomat reported to POLITIK, “Uzbek entrepreneurs have started utilizing the Ust-Luga port in the Leningrad region for transit.” Another source from Tashkent highlighted the overwhelming demand on the Baikal-Amur Mainline and the Vladivostok port, leading to redirecting part of the Uzbek supply after the war broke out.

“Uzbek carriers previously relied on the Nekhoteyevka checkpoint along the Belgorod and Kharkov regions to deliver goods to Ukraine, Moldova, and Poland. By the time we switched to using Vladivostok in 2023, we encountered significant delays,” the source noted, recalling that a container train service from Tashkent to Vladivostok had been established long before the conflict.

Despite these challenges, realizing the need for new trade routes has propelled the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China railway project forward, as reported by POLITIK, with support from sources within the Kyrgyz government.

Countries within the EAEU, including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, have been utilized extensively for circumvention strategies against the West’s anti-Russian sanctions. Remarkably, even small Kyrgyzstan has managed to excel in this maneuvering just as much as its larger neighbor. This success can be attributed to the Kyrgyz customs service’s willingness to accommodate importers, a liberal financial framework, and the ease of establishing an LLC—a Russian equivalent with a minimal authorized capital of just 1,000 rubles. Russian businesses have taken advantage of this, setting up local offices in Kyrgyzstan to re-export various goods while benefiting from the common customs area. As a result, some small Kyrgyz villages have seen companies with turnover reaching millions.

“Bishkek quickly recognized the opportunities that this new situation presented and has seized them without hesitation,” Rakhimov tells POLITIK. “We’re generating money through intricate schemes that can be almost impossible to trace.”

However, this approach has had consequences. One Kyrgyzstani bank, Keremet, has faced sanctions. On February 17, the National Bank of the Republic urged financial institutions to exercise greater caution to avoid further complications.

The intricate nature of these schemes, combined with frequent manipulation of trade statistics, makes it nearly impossible to distinguish the true levels of commerce in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, or Kyrgyzstan from Russian re-exports. The volume of re-export has sometimes become counterproductive for Russia itself. For instance, last spring, the Russian government sought to “clarify” how recycling fees for cars from EAEU countries were calculated, noting that customs clearance was considerably cheaper than cars imported directly from China, Georgia, or other non-EAEU nations. Nevertheless, this restrictive measure primarily affected less expensive Chinese and Korean vehicles. At the same time, luxurious European and American brands continued to flow into Russia from Central Asia.

 The conflict has led to a significant drop in the exchange rates of national currencies. For instance, the Kazakhstani tenge has devalued by 15% over the past year, resulting in higher costs for goods and overall living expenses. While Kazakhstan is making efforts to diversify its foreign trade relationships, its geographical closeness to Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) limits the country’s economic flexibility.

On the eve of the third anniversary of the war’s onset, ongoing hostilities have begun to directly impact trade in Central Asia. This is particularly evident with the recent attack by Ukrainian drones on the Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station in Krasnodar Territory. Kyiv has confirmed its involvement in this strike as a measure to disrupt oil supplies to the Russian military. Notably, the Kropotkinskaya station is part of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which, although partially owned by Russian corporations, is responsible for transporting Kazakh oil to Novorossiysk. The damage inflicted on the station has sparked considerable frustration in Astana, prompting Minister of Foreign Affairs Aibek Smadiyarov to announce that the issue will be addressed through diplomatic channels.

Additionally, in the past year and a half, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have emerged as consumers of Russian gas, which has become increasingly available following the loss of the European market. This shift can be considered historic, given that the infrastructure established during the Soviet era was primarily intended to supply gas from Central Asia to Russia, not the other way around.

In essence, the Russia-Ukraine war took the Central Asian countries by surprise. Trade and logistics were thrown into chaos, and the possible political consequences forced regional leaders—caught between their strong ties to Russia and their desire for closer economic relations with the West—to be extremely careful with their words and positions. Still, despite the initial shock, the Central Asian republics managed to adapt, and some even found ways to benefit from the war while keeping good relations with all sides. But since February 24, 2022, one message from the region has remained the same: it would have been better if there were no war.

POLITIK Central Asia

• #Politics
• #Popular