Out of focus. What Donald Trump’s victory means for Central Asia

Relations between the United States and Central Asian countries have historically lacked significant development. If Washington has shown interest in the region, it has primarily been due to events occurring on the outskirts of the five former Soviet republics, including Russia and Afghanistan. For over 30 years since gaining independence, Central Asian states have remained largely overlooked by American policymakers. Although the last three US administrations have made efforts to establish more organized interactions with the region and maintain continuity despite the shifts between Democratic and Republican leadership, it cannot be said that they have entirely succeeded. Consequently, with the election of Republican Donald Trump, who signaled intentions to overhaul global relations, the future of U.S.-Central Asian relations has taken on new significance.

Central Asia, too far for Washington

Over the past decades, American and regional experts have published many analytical materials studying the relations between the United States and Central Asia. These reports consistently conclude that this region has never been a priority for Washington’s foreign policy, regardless of whether Democrats or Republicans are in power. They emphasize that this oversight requires urgent correction.

When reviewing official documents and statements from US leadership, it’s noticeable that the United States was among the first nations to recognize the independence of the five former Soviet republics at the “strategic crossroads” between Europe and Asia. For years, Washington has maintained that the stability and prosperity of this region align with American national interests. Consequently, the United States has expressed its readiness to invest in developing and strengthening the sovereignty of the Central Asian countries.

As Temur Umarov, a research fellow at the Carnegie Berlin Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, pointed out to POLITIK Central Asia, the region’s omission from US foreign policy priorities can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, geography plays a crucial role—Central Asia is too far from the United States. Secondly, the region does not lie in the “border zone” of the global power struggle, where American influence could be decisively impactful.

“Hypothetically, if Central Asia were situated like Ukraine or Georgia—sandwiched between two powerful neighbors and leaning towards the West while sharing borders with Russia or China—it would likely attract more attention,” Umarov commented. “In such a scenario, the US might view it worthwhile to invest significant resources to bring the region closer to the West, potentially leading to pro-Western governments distancing themselves from Russia. However, this situation is fundamentally unfeasible, as the region is landlocked and surrounded by non-Western nations.”

Central Asia expert Arkady Dubnov, in a discussion with POLITIK Central Asia, highlighted an interesting perspective on the region’s role in global geopolitics. He pointed out that the US views Central Asia primarily as a buffer between Russia and China rather than an area of special interest. Dubnov remarked, “Americans do not consider it a zone of special interest. It’s neither part of the Pacific nor the Atlantic but a buffer zone. Additionally, Central Asia is not seen as a potential market, nor is its resource potential considered critical for Washington.”

Temur Umarov agrees with this assessment, noting that it is pretty difficult for the United States to trade with Central Asia due to its remoteness. Although American companies (from the oil and gas sector and the rare earth metals industry) are present in the region, their activities are not at all to the same extent as they could be under other political and geographical circumstances.

For comparison, in the first half of 2024, Kazakhstan, the wealthiest nation in Central Asia, recorded a trade turnover of around $14 billion with China and $12 billion with Russia, while its trade with the US amounted to about $2 billion. Notably, exports from Kazakhstan to the US surged 95%, primarily fueled by oil and rare earth metals. In Uzbekistan, the second-largest economy in the region, trade figures with the US also trail those with Russia and China. During the same timeframe, Uzbekistan’s trade with China hit $5.8 billion and reached $5.7 billion with Russia, while trade with the US stood at only $463 million—a rise of $181 million compared to the previous year.

New strategy with old patterns

However, over the past three decades since gaining independence, the five Central Asian republics have caught the attention of global powers at various times. A significant increase in interest occurred after the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001, following the September 11 terrorist attacks. The US sought a strategic base to conduct military operations, and the Central Asian countries bordering Afghanistan were ideally positioned for this purpose. Consequently, American military bases were established in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The republics benefited from American financial support, while Washington gained a crucial foothold in the region. Additionally, the United States possessed a valuable chance to transform the growing military logistics collaboration into an expanded foothold within the region.

Despite these opportunities, this partnership, initially driven by the needs of the Afghan operation, never evolved into a deeper relationship. By 2005, the US base in Uzbekistan was shut down after Washington condemned the violent suppression of protests in Andijan. The US presence in Kyrgyzstan lasted until 2014 but eventually ended partly due to pressure from Moscow on Bishkek.

Over a decade of direct US presence in the region has ended, and Central Asia continues to serve as a transit point for Washington, albeit now as a former one.

When Donald Trump took office, his administration maintained the C5+1 format despite differing foreign policy perspectives. In fact, efforts to refine the US approach to the region continued, culminating in the publication of a formal policy document titled “The U.S. Strategy for Central Asia 2019–2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity” in 2020. Before this, strategies were generally drafted under the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and tended to be more vague and non-public.

The strategy for 2019-2025 highlighted that Central Asia is a “geostrategic region crucial to the national security interests of the United States, irrespective of the level of US involvement in Afghanistan.” In essence, Washington acknowledged that its presence in Central Asia had often been interpreted solely through the prism of the Afghan conflict. The goal was to emphasize that this region merits dedicated attention on its own, independent of that context.

However, two of the six points listed as US “policy goals” still explicitly tied back to Afghanistan, while another—”reducing terrorist threats in Central Asia”—pointed to a connection with the Afghan situation, despite not naming the country directly.

The Biden administration, which succeeded Trump, opted not to modify this strategic document. Interestingly, under Biden, there was yet another surge of attention directed toward Central Asia, although this was more a reaction to external circumstances than a shift in official strategy. Following the onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on February 24, 2022, the United States and its allies imposed stringent sanctions against Moscow, which then sought ways to evade these restrictions. In this context, Central Asian countries emerged as critical trade and economic gateways for Russia, a development that alarmed the United States. In response, the US increased its diplomatic efforts, dispatching several delegations to the region to ensure compliance with the sanctions regime.

Particularly frequent in the capitals of Central Asia was Assistant Secretary of State Donald Lu, and in late February to early March 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken conducted a tour of the region. By September 2023, the C5+1 platform reached new heights when, for the first time, a meeting took place between the US President and the leaders of the five republics on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. This development received positive reactions. Notably, the joint statement from the six leaders following the talks did not mention Russia or Ukraine, and the White House press release similarly omitted references to either country. Through this strategic approach, the Biden administration aimed to express a genuine and robust commitment to Central Asia, highlighting its intention to foster new collaborative opportunities for the five republics that extend beyond the immediate geopolitical challenges.

With the new Trump at the helm

Another rather remarkable moment occurred during the summit in September 2023. Summing up the negotiations, Joe Biden, in particular, said: “So, thank you very much for making the effort to participate. And I look forward to meeting with you soon, perhaps in one of your countries.”

At first glance, this expression of ordinary politeness and a somewhat formal promise to hold the next meeting at the presidential level in one of the nations in the region carried significant weight. No sitting US president has visited Central Asia officially in over 30 years since the five former Soviet republics gained independence. Even George W. Bush, under whose presidency the military operation in Afghanistan began, never found the time to visit this important region. Thus, if Biden had followed through on his casually made suggestion, it would have marked a historic moment in U.S.-Central Asia relations.

However, the outgoing president never made it to the region, which means the chance for a sitting Oval Office occupant to step onto Central Asian soil once again falls to Donald Trump.

It is hard to believe that the Republican, who has recently dealt with issues in Russia, Ukraine, and the Middle East, would choose to take such a trip. However, this does not change the critical question of what will happen to relations between the United States and Central Asian countries during Trump’s second presidential term.

On one hand, the likely scenario is that things will stay the same as they are now. As Temur Umarov pointed out, this region isn’t a priority for Washington, so decisions about it are typically made at a bureaucratic level rather than at the top echelons of government. This bureaucratic process tends to be stable and isn’t prone to dramatic shifts when power changes from one party to another.

“The ambassadors currently in Central Asia didn’t just arrive yesterday; they were already in place during Trump’s term and continued under Biden. The State Department’s bureaucratic level will remain consistent,” Umarov explained.

On the flip side, some subtle shifts are bound to occur with the change in administration. Umarov noted that during Trump’s first term, his strong focus on confronting China led Washington to express its concerns rather bluntly about the region’s growing ties with Beijing.

“Central Asia didn’t appreciate it,” Umarov recalled. “Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where he repeatedly emphasized how important it was for the Central Asian countries to steer clear of China and not to engage in business with them. This approach was met with strong negative reactions, as the countries in the region wanted to avoid being pulled into America’s confrontation with China. Biden maintained a similar stance but framed it differently, suggesting that Washington doesn’t care who is present in the region—whether it’s Russia, China, or anyone else. While official statements won’t mention the Russian Federation or China specifically, they will reference ‘US strategic interests in Central Asia.’ Yet, everyone understands that this implies a desire to allow these countries to diversify their international relations and resist both Russia’s influence and China’s growing presence.”

According to Arkady Dubnov, there are currently no signs that US relations with Central Asia will worsen under Trump. Much will depend on the future direction of Washington’s policy toward China, which remains uncertain. Even if Trump follows through on his election promises and initiates a tough trade confrontation with China, it’s unlikely that the five republics will find themselves merely caught in the crossfire. “However, if Washington perceives that China’s influence in the region threatens US interests and decides to intervene, then some actions might be taken,” Dubnov conceded.

Temur Umarov also noted that Washington’s potential interest in the region over the next four years will likely be tied to the White House’s focus on China. He believes the bureaucracy will strive to take the initiative, understanding that ” budgets ” are tied to the president’s attention to China. “The department overseeing Central Asia will want to ensure its relevance and expand its influence. For the department to succeed, its personnel will be eager to frame their work in terms that align with the ‘Chinese’ narrative,” the expert suggested.

Another potential reason for heightened US attention to Central Asia could be the Caspian region, especially in light of Trump’s plans to confront Iran, which, like Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, also has access to the sea, as noted by Dubnov.

“The interests of the United States and Russia may be at odds here,” Dubnov suggested. “Nikolai Patrushev, an aide to the Russian president and head of the Maritime Collegium, recently stated that Russia will seek to block third countries from using Caspian infrastructure. This primarily pertains to Kazakhstan, which has significant facilities and ports on the Caspian, unlike Turkmenistan.”

In other words, the relationship between the US and Central Asia during Trump’s administration will largely hinge on two factors: first, Washington’s overarching global strategy concerning the region, and second, the Republican administration’s ability to communicate its needs and expectations to the five republics effectively. This is especially true if the White House acknowledges these nations’ significant role in the broader confrontation between the US and other global players.

Ultimately, as Temur Umarov emphasized, the Central Asian states “seek attention from the US, believing that such recognition serves as a badge of honor they can proudly display.”

Alexey Zabrodin

• #Politics
• #Popular