The crackdown on migrants has become one of Russia’s main issues since last year. It’s not always about illegal immigrants — authorities in several regions are imposing restrictions on many sectors that can no longer hire foreigners. However, after the March terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall, carried out by four Tajik nationals, their compatriots have become one of the most unwanted and suspicious groups in Russia. Despite Tajikistan’s heavy economic and political dependence on Russia, its government has consistently tried to stand up for its citizens, raising this issue with Russian officials — and they’re doing it far more vocally than neighboring countries.


An endless issue

Although Russia and Tajikistan have been considered strategic partners for many years, with units of Russia’s 201st military base stationed in Dushanbe and Bokhtar, discussions around the migrant issue often become heated. For instance, in 2012, Dushanbe explicitly linked the extension of the base agreement with easing regulations for Tajik labor migrants in Russia, along with other economic concessions — even suggesting direct payment for the base’s presence. At the time, the commander of the Russian ground forces referred to this approach as “an unseemly Eastern bargaining.” Ultimately, the matter was settled when Vladimir Putin visited Dushanbe to congratulate his Tajik counterpart, Emomali Rahmon, on his 60th birthday — just two days before his own (Rahmon was born on October 5, and Putin on October 7, 1952).

After those discussions, Putin announced that Russia would extend the registration period for Tajik citizens to 15 days and grant work permits for up to three years. “This will have a positive impact on our country’s labor market and allow Tajik citizens to plan their lives on a more stable foundation,” he explained, according to a report by Kommersant at the time. However, Dushanbe delayed ratifying the agreement, prompting Moscow to act quickly to fulfill its commitments.

Later, in 2016, Tajik citizens found themselves in a scandal after being caught up in violent clashes at Moscow’s Khovanskoye cemetery. A court ruling revealed that the cemetery director, Yuri Chabuev, was frustrated that Tajiks were offering burial services, including grave digging, without prior coordination with the administration. Allegedly, he enlisted local athletes to remove them or compel them to share their earnings forcibly. In response, Tajik diplomats took swift action; they sent a note to the Russian ambassador in Dushanbe requesting a thorough investigation. Sarvar Bakhti, a representative from the Tajik Embassy in Russia, defended the workers’ position in Russian media.

There have been ongoing disputes regarding flights between Russia and Tajikistan, with Dushanbe voicing its discontent over the way airlines operate and the imbalances in fare levels.

As for the latest developments, just over a year ago, in August 2023, Tajikistan dispatched inspection teams to Russia to look into the working conditions of its migrants. Russian media speculated that this move was merely populism meant to smooth the transition of power from Emomali Rahmon to his son, Rustam. While significant progress hasn’t been made on this front — although the president’s son increasingly represents Tajikistan on foreign trips — the need to protect labor migrants’ rights has come to the forefront since then.

Before and after Crocus

The largest terrorist attack in modern Russian history since Beslan (which occurred in 2004, exactly 20 years ago) has served as validation for authorities focused on migration control. They argue that such an event would not have happened if the measures had been stricter.

The attack was carried out by four Tajik citizens (Dalerjon Mirzoev, Saidakrami Rachabalizoda, Shamsiddin Fariduni, and Muhammadsobir Faizov), who, upon arrest, spoke about anonymous sponsors on Telegram who allegedly offered 500,000 rubles ($5,120) for the act. Even though sources within the investigative team later clarified that the channel in question was “Voice of Khorasan” (linked to the terrorist group “Wilayat Khorasan,” a branch of the Islamic State), the primary narrative focused on the involvement of Ukrainian intelligence services, suggesting that they had contacted the migrants under the guise of Islamist recruiters.

This situation greatly benefited those who portray migrants as potential terrorists and saboteurs (who, for example, might photograph air defense systems in certain Russian cities and pass information to Ukraine). The suggested solution to prevent such risks is often pre-emptive action: migrants are offered the chance to sign military contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense and go to the front in exchange for citizenship (for more details, see the article “ Moscow has made Central Asia look elsewhere ” in this issue).

According to POLITIK Central Asia, migrants themselves report that Russian authorities may use the threat of deportation as leverage. For example, Alisher from Dushanbe worked at a construction site in the Moscow region with all his documents in order. Despite this, he was detained during one of the frequent raids carried out by Russian security forces. “I hadn’t even received my first paycheck, and they were already talking about deporting me. It was a horrifying experience, leaving me feeling completely trapped. I’d spent money on airfare, paperwork, and a work permit, only to feel like it was all in vain,” he shares. While in the detention center, officials informed Alisher and the other detainees that signing a military contract could lead to citizenship and a one-time payment of 1.2 million rubles for them and their families. Although Alisher and his friends were finally released after two months, he remembers that around ten people chose to sign the contract during their time there.

Enhanced checks on Tajik citizens in Russian airports began in the spring after the Crocus City Hall attack and continue to this day. The Tajik government even advised its citizens to avoid traveling to Russia “unless absolutely necessary” and acknowledged that “unwarranted entry denials have become widespread.” “These actions are applied exclusively to Tajik citizens, which is fundamentally incompatible with the spirit and traditions of Tajik-Russian relations,” said a note delivered to Russian Ambassador Semen Grigoriev on April 29.

Seven months after the terrorist attack, Tajik political analyst Sherali Rizoyon shared his experience on Telegram, even though he was only transiting through Russia en route to Belarus and didn’t intend to enter the country.

“At Pulkovo Airport, a group of around 30 Tajik citizens from Dushanbe was detained for three hours. The entire process could have been handled much more efficiently. The way we were treated by the ‘inspectors’ differed widely—while some were respectful, the majority were openly condescending and rude. Initially, all Tajik nationals were gathered in a separate area of the airport before being called in one by one for questioning. They asked about the purpose of our trip, where we lived, and our future plans, recording our answers on a special form,” Rizoyon shares. “The inspectors scrutinized our passports, and if they noticed stamps from other countries, they probed into the reasons for those travels. Then came the examination of our phones: they sifted through our social media, photos, and videos and probably even read our messages. Interestingly, some were asked, ‘Why aren’t you using Telegram?’ The peak of the ordeal was the so-called ‘voluntary-compulsory’ fingerprinting and photographing session, which felt straight out of a Hollywood crime movie—first from the front, then from the side. After enduring all these ‘procedures,’ we were herded into groups and escorted to the border checkpoint like prisoners of war.”

A disturbing new trend has also emerged in these raids, with police enlisting assistance from nationalist groups like “Northern Man” and “Russian Druzhina.”

These measures, along with the introduction of an electronic migrant ID in Moscow, impact citizens from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan alike. However, there are specific factors that set Tajik migrants apart from the others.

Ilya Pitalev/ RIA NOVOSTI


It’s bad away, but no better at home

Despite Moscow’s persistent suggestions, Tajikistan has not joined the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) like Uzbekistan. “We are very hopeful that your Tajik hosts, who have provided this hospitable territory, will soon recognize the benefits of joining the Eurasian Economic Union,” stated Sergei Lavrov in June last year, and not just anywhere, but directly on the premises of the Russian military base in Dushanbe. However, Tajikistan, through the words of the Director of the Department of Information and Press of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shohin Samadi, responded negatively: “The issue of Tajikistan joining the EAEU is not on the agenda.”

This decision carries significant implications for migrants, who, without EAEU membership, must secure work permits. Nevertheless, citizens of Tajikistan have discovered an alternative route to gain access to privileges in Russia: they are applying for Russian citizenship through the compatriot resettlement program. According to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, over 100,000 individuals pursue this option each year, a fact that Russian nationalists often point to, arguing that migration to Russia has become a “replacement” process. Notably, Tajik citizens lead in the number of applications, with Armenia and Kazakhstan following.

Recent developments, however, have revealed that it can be surprisingly easy to lose Russian citizenship. For instance, there have already been 2,400 cases in 2024 of individuals who lost their citizenship after opting out of military service. While this figure is relatively small in comparison to the overall population, it indicates a troubling trend that could escalate, especially given the rising concerns voiced by both the State Duma and security agencies about migrants being perceived as a threat. As a result, the distinction between illegal immigrants, legal foreigners, and those who have gained Russian passports is increasingly blurring.

According to Temur Umarov, an expert from the Carnegie Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies in Berlin, the key difference between Tajikistan and neighboring countries like Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan lies in the lack of alternatives for Tajik citizens. “Kyrgyzstan’s EAEU membership provides its citizens with significant advantages when working in Russia. Uzbekistan is also making progress in developing its industry and creating job opportunities, supported by effective diplomacy that opens new markets for labor migration. In contrast, Tajikistan lacks these benefits, and the recent terrorist attack in ‘Crocus’ severely affected their standing. Their reputation among migrants has been badly tarnished — not just in Russia, but even Türkiye has revoked its visa-free agreement with Tajikistan. Consequently, the authorities find themselves in a tight spot, forced to seek leniency from Moscow, as they have few other options,” the expert explained.

Appeals at all levels

Throughout the year, President Rahmon and his team have consistently brought up the topic of migrants with Moscow. The first instance occurred during the Victory Day parade, where President Rahmon personally addressed what he referred to as a “very sensitive” issue with Putin. Notably, no other regional leader has approached the Kremlin directly about this matter.

In October, as the Russian State Duma was deliberating additional measures against migrants, a series of meetings and statements quickly followed. This flurry began with the visit of Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin, who oversees the construction sector, to Dushanbe. Just a day later, Tajikistan’s Prime Minister Kokhir Rasulzoda — who, alongside President Rahmon, met with Khusnullin — highlighted the contradictions in Russia’s approach: despite restrictions on Tajik migrants, the number of workers coming from Tajikistan is on the rise. This prompted even tougher statements from Tajik officials.

For instance, on October 14, Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin remarked that the current situation “does not align with basic humanitarian principles and raises questions about the fundamental tenets of the CIS.” He called for a “comprehensive, careful, and transparent approach to migration issues,” one that takes into account the interests of the host country, the country of origin, the workers themselves, and the local populace.

The Tajik human rights ombudsman spoke in a similar tone. “Umid Bobozoda demanded that his Russian counterpart, Tatyana Moskalkova, ensure that Russian law enforcement officers respect the rights of Tajik citizens and that she takes control of and investigates such cases,” his letter stated after listing instances of “beatings and humiliations” and extended inspections that include women and children.

Dushanbe’s actions suggest a desire for a systemic solution to this issue. After Marat Khusnullin’s visit, Rahmon met with Valentina Matvienko, the Speaker of the Federation Council. “We discussed sensitive issues, including labor migration. These matters were handled constructively and civilized — without unnecessary emotions, or the hype outsiders might hope to exploit to drive a wedge between Russia and Tajikistan. They won’t succeed,” remarked Matvienko.

Following the October discussions, Rahmon announced, “Relevant ministries and agencies have received instructions to bolster the activities of the migration office and the Agency for Employment Abroad, to enhance international cooperation, and to diversify migration strategies.”

However, as political expert Temur Umarov noted in his interview with POLITIK Central Asia, this strategy may not bear fruit. “For a long time, Tajikistan has viewed itself as the primary supplier of labor, believing it has the right to question the conditions facing its citizens—especially amid troubling reports about the conscription of migrants for the frontline. The concern is that such appeals have limited influence on the situation in Russia. During wartime, each Russian agency is driven by its own priorities: some aim to keep the economy staffed, others focus on offensive operations in Donbas, while some react to incidents like the ‘Crocus’ event. These conflicting objectives become a significant barrier, making it nearly impossible to address the issue systematically,” concluded Umarov.