As the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) celebrates its 15th anniversary this year, it stands at a pivotal moment in its evolution. While its members recognize the value of such an association, they have yet to harness its full potential. Will it be an economic bloc with maximum customs concessions? Or perhaps evolve into a unified security zone characterized by regular joint exercises and enhanced intelligence collaboration? There’s also the possibility of creating an integrated system where diplomas, driver’s licenses, and various certificates are mutually recognized. While the organization has recently undertaken initiatives to raise its profile through information events, the question of its ultimate direction remains open. In 2021, it changed its name from the “Turkic Council” to OTS; in 2022, it included Northern Cyprus as an observer (recognized as a state only by Türkiye); in 2023, it announced the motto of the year as TurkTime!, and in 2024 it approved a unified Turkic alphabet. Nevertheless, pursuing innovative ideas continues, and there is optimism that this might lead to meaningful advancements.

West and east of the Caspian Sea

On November 5-6, the 11th summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) will be held in Kyrgyzstan’s capital, where the country will take over the organization’s chairmanship for the upcoming year. Until then, Kazakhstan will continue to be the formal leader of the Turkic world, a status it earned at last year’s summit in Astana. As preparations for the main event are underway, Kyrgyzstan has already started to welcome specialized delegations to discuss specific issues. For instance, on September 6, the interior ministers of the Turkic states convened in Cholpon-Ata, situated on the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul, and on October 18, the ministers of economy and trade met in Bishkek.

The main word highlighted in both meetings was “unity.” Participants agreed that unity needs to be strengthened across all areas to create a union “that can endure for many years, perhaps even centuries.” However, a brief look at the map shows that the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) consists of countries that consider themselves part of different regions. The Caspian Sea is a natural boundary separating the South Caucasus between Türkiye, Russia, and Iran from the five Central Asian countries that naturally connect and are linked to China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Although Iran could theoretically act as a land bridge between these two regions, it has historically set itself apart from the Turkic world despite having significant populations of Azeris (16%) and Turkmens (2%).

Hungary, too, stands out as an outsider in the organization. Having joined as an observer when it was still the “Turkic Council” in 2019, Budapest has yet to elevate its status to full member. This delay isn’t just about ideological differences regarding Hungary’s connections to the Turkic world. While the Hungarian language belongs to the Ugric branch, it has historically incorporated influences from Turkic nomads during the early medieval period, particularly when they likely mingled with Ugric tribes in the Danube plains around the 9th and 10th centuries. Additionally, Hungary was under Ottoman rule from 1526 to 1699. Despite the Hungarian government’s efforts to carve out its own identity apart from the EU, its geographical position makes it challenging to foster strong economic ties with Central Asia. While Hungarian Foreign and Trade Minister Péter Szijjártó managed to visit Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan this year, Hungary achieved a major milestone with Kazakhstan last year: Hungarian company MOL began developing the Rozhkovsky oil and gas condensate field near the city of Oral.

The geographical differences and varying economic landscapes contribute to the diverse motivations for participation among member countries, highlighting a distinct contrast between those located west and east of the Caspian Sea.

Kubatbek Rakhimov, a political scientist and Executive Director of the public fund “Applikata – Center for Strategic Solutions,” has noted that Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Hungary are viewed as potential investors for projects within the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Yet, these expectations seldom materialize. “In Central Asia, we regard any form of integration as an opportunity for benefit,” Rakhimov explained to POLITIK Central Asia. “However, I have doubts about Türkiye’s ability to make bold financial moves given its annual inflation rate of 72%. Additionally, the Turkish labor market isn’t particularly appealing—the incomes there are not much different from those in Russia or Kazakhstan. If one aims high, seeking opportunities in the European Union might make more sense. For the OTS to become economically viable, Türkiye must develop strategies that enhance access to Central Asian goods in their markets. Ultimately, it all hinges on Türkiye’s financial capacity. I strongly doubt that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, or Kyrgyzstan would be willing to contribute more to the Organization of Turkic States than they are guaranteed to receive in return.”

Azerbaijan, a steadfast ally of Türkiye during challenging times, is keen to enhance its influence east of the Caspian Sea. In 2023, Baku established a joint $500 million investment fund with Tashkent and, in 2024, with Astana—though this time at $300 million. Reports also show a sharp increase in Azerbaijani investments in Kyrgyzstan, but this simply reflects a low base effect: from $2 million, investments rose to $27 million.

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Turkish diplomat Halil Akıncı, who was instrumental in promoting Turkic integration and served as the first Secretary General of the “Turkic Council” from 2009 to 2014, acknowledges the existing imbalance but views it as temporary. “These Central Asian countries have been deprived of self-governance for centuries,” he stated in an interview with Politik Central Asia. “They simply don’t understand how things operate. If they knew what needed to be done, they wouldn’t rely on gas for electricity generation. They have abundant hydropower resources; they just require better organization. If you want to attract investment, you must first take the initiative yourself.”

Halil Akıncı suggests granting observer status to Mongolia, Korea, and Japan as part of the organization’s next development phase. He cites “linguistic connections” as a reason for this proposal. However, this stance is somewhat contentious; although Korean and Japanese are categorized within the Altaic language family alongside Turkic, they have evolved in relative isolation, resulting in the loss of many similarities. Akıncı also proposes introducing a new status—partner—to include a wider array of countries.

“We are witnessing the institutionalization of the OTS and some formal expansion of its activities. However, there is a lack of collaboration that could elevate the OTS to the status of a significant regional player,” stated Kazakh political analyst Dimash Alzhanov in an interview with Politik Central Asia. “Considering the varying economic levels of member states, most of which are autocracies, any growth potential may remain untapped.”

Identity above all

To truly understand OTS and its future development plans, one would expect that its foundational program document, “Turkic Vision – 2040,” adopted during the Istanbul summit in 2021, would provide clear insights. However, after sifting through this extensive text, it becomes apparent that it doesn’t offer much clarity.

Even in the absence of the Organization of Turkic States, it is evident that countries in the region can recognize the vital importance of creating “sustainable multimodal connections” with their neighboring nations, streamline border-crossing procedures, “aim to raise the political, economic, social, and cultural standards of their societies,” and promote the digital economy and tourism “along the ancient Silk Road.”

Even within the program’s thematic sections, there’s a noticeable lack of specifics compared to some UN General Assembly resolutions. Nonetheless, they do offer some material for analysis. The section on economics is the most detailed, while the one on security is the briefest. The document lists vague statements like “combating radicalism, extremism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia” and “ensuring effective cooperation among law enforcement agencies to tackle transnational organized crime.”

In this context, one of the most significant aspects of the document revolves around the themes of ideology and identity. This encompasses establishing a cohesive media landscape, notably highlighting the importance of feature films and documentaries that illustrate the shared history and culture of the Turkic world. It also includes fostering scientific collaboration through the development of an “academic diaspora” and providing funding for research related to “common Turkic history, culture, literature, and geography.” These topics are intended to be integrated into the school curricula of member states. Ideally, these initiatives could be centralized under a dedicated organization, modeled after a political association like “TURKSOY,” which would serve as a regional equivalent to UNESCO.

A similar trend can be observed when we focus on forming a common Turkic identity, especially in the news surrounding the OTS. For instance, the Turkic Academy, based in Astana and promotes scientific and educational collaboration among the OTS countries, recently presented an alphabet that could serve as a universal standard for all Turkic languages. However, its practical application seems unlikely, as countries like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan already have their versions of the Latin alphabet. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan continues to use the Cyrillic alphabet and has no plans for change.

This isn’t the first time a symbolic initiative has backfired, failing to benefit the organization and even inviting irony. At the end of 2022, during the summit in Samarkand, a heated debate erupted over Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s proposal to grant observer status to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which is recognized as an independent state only by Ankara. According to sources from the Kommersant newspaper, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev firmly opposed this idea, adhering strictly to the principle of territorial integrity, while Uzbek leader Shavkat Mirziyoyev chose to abstain. Notably, Vladimir Norov, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan, publicly emphasized that recognizing Northern Cyprus as an independent state was out of the question. Nevertheless, once the summit concluded, Erdogan proclaimed that the observer status issue for Northern Cyprus was “closed and resolved.”

Another example of Ankara directly imposing its vision of “Turkic unity” on the region emerged on the eve of the meeting in Bishkek. The Ministry of Education of Türkiye has mandated using the term “Turkestan” to refer to Central Asia. While these changes are meant to affect only Turkish school textbooks, the way the Turkish media operates suggests that this label will likely be adopted by official outlets like Anadolu, TRT, and Yeni Şafak across all languages. So far, Central Asian governments have not commented on this issue, and reactions within the expert community was mixed. While the effort to define the region in a way that moves away from Soviet associations is understandable, emphasizing ethnic ties feels outdated and overlooks Tajikistan, which is an essential part of Central Asia.

In the context of ideology and forming a pan-Turkic identity, Azerbaijan’s efforts to frame its victory in the 44-day war of 2020 as significant for both the western and eastern shores of the Caspian Sea are noteworthy. Last summer, prior to the scheduled summit in Bishkek, President Ilham Aliyev convened leaders of the Organization of Turkish States (OTS) for an informal summit in Shusha—the historical center of Karabakh, which was designated as the “cultural capital of the Turkic world.”

Along similar ideological lines aimed at building a shared Turkic identity, Azerbaijan has portrayed its 2020 victory in the 44-day war as a milestone for both the western and eastern shores of the Caspian Sea. Therefore, back in the summer, without waiting for the meeting in Bishkek, Ilham Aliyev convened the leaders of the amalgamated territorial communities for an informal summit in Shusha, the historical center of Karabakh, which was designated the “cultural capital of the Turkic world.”

However, there was indeed a certain significance to this. First, the agreement to create the Turkic Council, the predecessor of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), was also signed in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan. Second, the resolution of the Karabakh conflict has opened up new opportunities for unblocking transport routes in the South Caucasus, aside from the existing Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. The contradictions between Baku and Yerevan are still so strong that such projects are far from being realized. Nevertheless, the Karabakh Declaration signed at the summit discusses logistics extensively. The parties state that they are “strengthening regional connections and economic integration among member states through the Trans-Caspian International Corridor ‘East-West’ (Middle Corridor)” and “highly value the modernization of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway and the trilateral efforts among Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Georgia aimed at accelerating customs control of goods and vehicles along this route.”

          Along the paths of Turan

“Cooperation among Turkic countries can be viewed in three distinct phases,” says Ilgar Velizade, an Azerbaijani political analyst for Politik Central Asia. “Before 2009, the nations held summits without a well-defined agenda, primarily to pinpoint shared priorities and foster collaboration. Their interactions were largely shaped by their linguistic and cultural ties. In 2009, this partnership took a significant turn with the establishment of the Cooperation Council of Turkic States (CCTS), commonly referred to as the Turkic Council. The focus then shifted towards economic collaboration and the initiation of joint transport initiatives, which became central themes in the summits throughout the 2010s. During this era, trade among these countries saw substantial growth; however, no formal union-style cooperation emerged. This backdrop led to discussions about forming the Organization of Turkic States to create a structured regional relationship. Yet, only time will reveal the outcomes of these efforts. For now, no one is reaching for the stars.”

The concept of “reaching for the stars” might be the idea of supranational organizations akin to those found in the European Union. However, even optimists of Turkic integration, such as Halil Akinji, acknowledge the utopian nature of such plans. Akinji remarks, “These countries have only recently attained independence; consequently, they are not prepared to relinquish a portion of their sovereignty to such structures.” It is unlikely that the Turkic Council can be transformed into a military bloc, given that two member states are part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and two (including Hungary) are affiliated with NATO, while the remaining nations are hesitant to join any alliances. Nevertheless, this situation does not preclude collaboration within the military sector, where these countries can jointly produce drones and armored vehicles.

Thus, all speakers for Politik Central Asia agree that the foundation of Turkic cooperation should be based on economics and logistics. There is indeed potential in this area. As Dimash Alzhanov notes, “The activities of the OTS gained momentum after the full-scale war in Ukraine and the tightening sanctions against Russia.The development of the Middle Corridor, along with Türkiye’s ambition to become a key hub for transporting goods from Central Asia and China to European markets, provides a solid basis for coordinated efforts and increased trade among Turkic states. This aligns the interests of all member countries without disrupting Russia’s goals. Notably, Kazakhstan has already ratified an agreement for a simplified customs corridor. “

Another avenue to stimulate economic growth within the Turkic Council is through digitalization. It has long been observed that delays at borders can be more time-consuming than outdated infrastructure. Despite some challenges, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have shifted to an electronic freight accounting system, with Turkmenistan gearing up to follow suit.

At the upcoming summit in Bishkek, these countries are set to endorse this approach and sign an agreement for completely paperless trade, the details of which were fine-tuned during a recent ministerial meeting. If successfully implemented, this initiative will connect the Turkic world more effectively than any lofty slogans or discussions about the legacy of the Timurids ever could.